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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research was to determine which variables help identify firms
that have reduced or eliminated postretirement benefits other than pensions (OPEBs).
Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) found that the adoption of SFAS No. 106 was one of the major
determinants in OPEB reduction decisions. Those authors also found that financial
weakness was a determinant in such reductions. This study attempts to determine the
possible factors involved in such decisions, including both financial weakness and the
OPEB liability, now that its disclosure is mandated by SFAS No. 106.
The theoretical backbone of this study was traced back to the work of Myers and
Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984), who discovered that firms generally restrict dividends
or take other steps to maintain financial slack. Stone (1987), Mittelstaedt (1989), and
Thomas (1989) found financial weakness to be a determinant in pension plan reduction
decisions.
Two-group discriminant analysis was used since the dependent variable was
categorical while the independent variables were continuous. Sample firms fell into two
groups: 1. No-change firms (firms that did not reduce or eliminate OPEBs), 2. Change
firms (firms that did reduce or eliminate OPEBs). Financial weakness variables and OPEB
liability variables were used in the model. Six hypotheses were tested.

iii
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The full sample consisted of 588 firms, but the very small proportion of change
firms to no-change firms confounded the results. A reduced and more balanced sample was
used in the final analysis. The final model had a classificatory accuracy of about 75 percent.
These results indicate that the relationship between financial weakness and OPEB
plan reductions may have changed since the adoption of SFAS No. 106 and that this
relationship is considerably weaker than that found in prior research. This study’s findings
also provide little evidence that there is a long-term negative effect associated with the
OPEB liability.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Prior to the issuance of SFAS No. 106, postretirement employee benefits other
than pensions (OPEBs) generally were accounted for by employers on a "pay-as-you-go"
(i.e., cash) basis, despite contractual promises to provide future benefits for current
service.1 The disclosure of the liability from this type of deferred compensation was not
required under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).2As premiums or claims
were paid, companies simply recorded them and disclosed these amounts as the expense.
These benefits had long been treated as if they were immaterial; but with the rising cost of
health care, an increasing number of retirees, and greater life expectancy among retirees,
this was increasingly being viewed by critics of accounting as nondisclosure of relevant
financial statement information concerning future cash flows. The need to rectify this
situation was formally acknowledged by the Financial Accounting Standards Board

'"OPEBs" is the acronym for "other (than pensions) postretirement employee benefits." OPEBs
is used in this study, and its use is consistent with nonpension retirement benefits literature.
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 81, Disclosure o f Postretirement Health Care
and Life Insurance Benefits, only required disclosure of: (1) the benefits provided and the employee groups
covered, (2) the employer's current accounting and funding policies for those benefits, and (3) the cost of
those benefits recognized for the period (FASB 1984).

1
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2
(FASB) as early as 1979 but it would take eleven years before SFAS No. 106 would make
accrual accounting for OPEBs part of GAAP.
Some of the major concerns surrounding SFAS No. 106 were that its
implementation would create a significant negative effect on companies' financial
statements, cause negative market effects, and cause many companies to reduce or
terminate nonpension postretirement plans (Grossman, Flory, and Phillips 1989), (Newell
1989). As mentioned in the next section, there is evidence that there were negative
financial statement and market effects, and evidence was found that suggests the adoption
o f this standard motivated many firms to reduce or terminate OPEBs.
Now that the OPEB liability is being recorded, as mandated by SFAS No. 106, can
the level of this liability help predict whether firms will reduce or terminate such plans,
now that we are in the post-SFAS 106 adoption period?

Definition of OPEBs
Nonpension postretirement employee benefits include, but are not limited to, life
insurance provided outside a pension plan to retirees; postretirement health care; and other
so-called “welfare” benefits such as day care, legal services, and housing subsidies. SFAS
No. 106 is applicable to aH postretirement benefits (other than pensions) expected to be
provided by the employer to current and former employees.
Health care benefits are becoming increasingly significant in terms of cost and
recurrence, and the rapid increase in the costs of these benefits has helped fuel the push
to accrue postretirement benefits’ costs.
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3
Health care benefits first were provided to employees as compensation for the
effects of price and wage freezes during World War II (Van Remortel 1988). With the
introduction of Medicare in 1965, the government began paying a significant portion o f
retirees' health care costs. Companies increased promised retiree health care benefits. They
promised to provide retiree health care benefits that would cover the small gap between
actual costs and what Medicare covered (Van Remortel 1988). This resulted in a rapid
increase in employer-provided health care insurance benefits for retirees. Companies
increasingly used such benefits to attract and keep employees. By 1988, health care
benefits were being provided to retirees by 82 percent of U.S. companies with 1,000 or
more employees, and by 91 percent of the companies with more than 5,000 employees
(Light, Treece, and Driscoll 1991; Amir, 1993).

This alone had made OPEBs an

increasingly important accounting issue.

Fundam ental Issue
A substantial amount of pension research has been conducted in recent years. For
example, Stone (1987), Mittelstaedt (1989), and Thomas (1989) examined determinants
of pension plan reductions and terminations. There were many more pension-related
studies conducted during this time but they are not directly related to this study. Despite
the large number of pension studies, OPEB research was extremely limited until the advent
o f SFAS No. 106. As will be mentioned in greater detail later, OPEBs were originally
considered immaterial in their cost, which was probably the main reason for the lack of
interest in studying the subject.
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4
In 1979, when the first Exposure Draft on postretirement benefits was issued, it
signaled the FASB's concerns about such costs. Were they material and should they be
accrued? In 1989, when the Exposure Draft that would become SFAS No. 106 was issued,
it created immediate interest in OPEBs because the proposal mandated the accrual o f a
liability for postretirement benefits. Firms had been treating these costs as immaterial so
one of the first research questions was to determine whether, since these firms had
previously understated both liabilities and expenses, there would be any negative effects
on such firms' securities in the financial markets once these costs were recorded properly.
In the early 1990s, a number of studies examined stock market effects due to the
creation of, for many firms, a large unfunded liability along with a transition obligation,
which would either be expensed or amortized over a period of 20 years. This will be
explained in greater detail later. Major studies included those by Espahbodi, Strock, and
Tehranian (1991), Amir (1993), Mittelstaedt and Warshawsky (1993), and Young (1993).
In 1994, Smith examined the relationship of financial strength to early adoption of SFAS
No. 106. Amir and Livnat (1996) and Amir (1997) also examined firms' timing of the
adoption of SFAS No. 106.
In 1995, the issue o f OPEB reductions was examined by Mittelstaedt, Nichols, and
Regier (1995), who tested the hypothesis that the adoption of SFAS No. 106 was a major
factor in such reductions. They found a significant statistical relationship between the
adoption of SFAS No. 106 and OPEB reductions. However, the adoption of the standard
was not the only factor in OPEB reductions. Financial weakness also appeared to be a
significant factor according to the study. This research will be covered later in this paper.
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The next logical step in OPEB research is to identify the determinants of reductions
in these benefits, now that the direct and immediate effects of SFAS No. 106 adoption are
past. Unlike pension research, OPEB research did not focus on plan reductions or
terminations prior to the existence of SFAS No. 106. It appears that all such research has
included the adoption of SFAS No. 106 as an independent variable in the analysis of these
benefit reductions.
Also, in this study the SFAS No. 106 liability will be used as an independent
variable in each of the years being examined. During the literature review, no studies were
found that used this liability as an independent variable in an attempt to determine OPEB
reduction decisions. The question is whether the changes in this liability correlate strongly
with OPEB reductions. Recent research, such as Mittelstaedt et al. (1995), found evidence
supporting the assertion that increased contracting costs caused by the adoption of SFAS
No. 106, along with financial weakness independent of it were the primary determinants
of such benefit reductions. To a lesser extent, firm-specific changes in retiree health care
costs were found to influence benefit reduction decisions.
Now, with the SFAS No. 106 liability established, the relationships among the
variables, which prior research found to have a statistically significant correlation with
OPEB reductions, almost certainly have changed. It is possible that some of the variables,
particularly the increased contracting cost variables, might be less significant, now that the
adoption of SFAS No. 106 is no longer a variable. Other variables, particularly those
relating to financial weakness, may be more significant. These relationships, as they apply
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to OPEB reductions and terminations, apparently were not studied prior to the FASB's
1989 Exposure Draft, which would become SFAS No. 106.
Studies examining pension plan reductions and terminations have found that
financial weakness is a determinant in the liquidation of assets of overfunded pension plans
and in the termination of overfunded plans (Stone 1987; Mittelstaedt 1989; Thomas 1989).
Specifically, these studies have examined the determinants of firms’ decisions to contract
or terminate overfunded pension plans. The studies found that both contractors (those who
reduce benefits) and terminators were financially weak prior to the decision to take these
actions. These findings are consistent with two hypotheses. First, Myers and Majluf (1984)
suggested that financially weak firms liquidated financial slack when internally generated
cash flows were insufficient and that these liquidations were done in an orderly fashion,
using the least costly sources o f financing first. Secondly, Mittelstaedt and Reiger (1993)
hypothesized that the value of upholding an implicit contract diminishes as a firm’s
financial health deteriorates, suggesting that financially weak firms are expected to
terminate plans. Also, the weakest firms generally eliminate defined benefit plans.
Although these findings alone might suggest that financial weakness would be a
determinant in OPEB reductions, such a direct comparison is generally not applicable. Few
OPEBs are funded, often making liquidation of fund assets unlikely. However, the fact that
financial weakness was a major factor in pension fund liquidations suggests that it might
be a significant factor in OPEB reduction decisions. Mittelstaedt, et al. (1995) found
financial weakness to be a major factor along with the adoption of SFAS No. 106 in OPEB
reduction decisions.
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Objective of the Study
This study seeks to determine which variables help identify firms that have reduced
or eliminated postretirement benefits other than pensions. Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) found
that the adoption of SFAS No. 106 could be cited as one of the major contributing factors
in the reduction and elimination of postretirement health benefits made by firms in the past
several years. However, Mittelstaedt et al. found that the adoption o f SFAS No. 106 was
not the only determinant in such reductions. This study attempts to determine the possible
factors involved in these decisions, including the OPEB liability itself, now that it is
disclosed according to the requirements of SFAS No. 106. Since the period being studied
includes only years in which this was in effect, the actual adoption of this statement is not
used as a variable. No studies have been found that use the OPEB liability as an
independent variable in attempting to identify determinants of benefit reductions or
terminations. The OPEB research that has been conducted (e.g., Mittelstaedt et al.) has
concentrated on the actual or anticipated adoption of SFAS No. 106 by firms as a factor
contributing to the reduction of postretirement benefits.
The results of this study will be useful to practitioners, researchers, and the general
public, as it will provide evidence regarding relationships between key independent
variables and reductions or terminations of OPEBs (the dependent variable). This study
may help determine the need and direction of future research in this area. It is intended to
fill a gap in current OPEB research. Pension research has found that financial weakness
is the most significant factor in explaining firms’ liquidation o f excess plan assets. Prior
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research suggests (e.g., Stone 1987) that firms tend to liquidate assets of overfunded
pension plans when other forms of financing were unavailable.

Accounting for OPEBs Prior to SFAS No. 106
Prior to the adoption of SFAS No. 106, OPEBs were reported by employers on
a "pay-as-you-go" (i.e., cash) basis, despite contractual promises to provide future benefits
for current service. This was due to the fact that these costs were felt to be immaterial at
one time (FASB 1981, f 2). However, this practice continued long after such costs became
material (FASB 1981, f 3). The fact that these costs had become material persuaded the
FASB to make changes in the way firms accounted for them.

W hv C hange W as N eeded
Since the benefits of current employees’ services are being received now, it is
consistent with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) that the future
expenditures on OPEBs be matched with the revenue currently being generated from the
employees’ work. When amounts are immaterial, accrual accounting is unnecessary. This
was the case for OPEBs at one point. However, the amounts spent on these benefits
increased dramatically over time, and, by the late 1970s, were no longer considered
immaterial by the FASB (FASB 1979, f 2). The upward trend in OPEB expenditures has
continued, so accounting for them using the pay-as-you-go (cash) method would be even
more likely to lead to material misstatements in the financial statements of companies
offering these benefits.
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The L ong Joum ev o f SFAS N o. 106
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Exposure Draft - 1979
Discussion Memorandum - 1981
Preliminary Reviews Document - 1982
Discussion Memorandum - 1983
Comments/Letters in Response to 1983 Discussion Memorandum
Exposure Draft - 1984
Responses to 1984 Exposure Draft
SFAS No. 8 1 -1984
Technical Bulletin - 1987
Exposure Draft - 1989
SFAS No. 106 - December, 1990

Purpose and Requirem ents o f SFAS N o. 106
The main purpose of SFAS No. 106 was to increase the accuracy and usefulness
of financial statements of those firms offering postretirement benefits other than pensions.
SFAS No. 106 requires the accrual of the expected cost of nonpension postretirement
benefits over the years the employee renders the service necessary to become eligible for
them. The employer must recognize in its statement of financial position its obligation for
OPEBs over the service life of its employees. This standard prohibits the practice of
accounting for OPEBs on a cash basis.
SFAS No. 106 focused largely on retiree medical (health) benefits. These benefits
generally comprise the largest part of postretirement benefits. The medical benefits also
are the fastest growing in total dollars. Under SFAS No. 106, the present value of
postretirement benefits should be accrued at the date an employee is fully eligible to
receive them. The employer must measure two obligations in deferring these benefits:
(1) the Expected Postretirement Benefit Obligation (EPBO), which is the actuarial present
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value of postretirement benefits expected to be paid after retirement to the employees and
their dependents, and (2) the Accumulated Postretirement Benefit Obligation (APBO),
which is the actuarial present value of all future benefits based on employees' service
rendered.
Firms offering OPEBs were required to adopt SFAS No. 106 for the fiscal years
beginning after December 15, 1992. However, for firms outside the United States and
certain small, nonpublic employers, the application of the statement was delayed until fiscal
years beginning after December 15, 1994 (FASB 1990, ^ 108).
Also, employers were allowed alternatives in recognizing the transition obligation,
the amount ofthe unfunded and previously unrecognized postretirement benefit obligation.
An employer could have either recognized the transition and the associated cost
immediately or amortized it on a straight-line basis over the average remaining service
period o f active plan participants. However, if the average remaining service period was
less than 20 years, the employer could have elected to use a 20-year period. Additionally,
if all or almost all o f the plan participants were inactive, the employer was required to use
the average remaining life expectancy period of those plan participants (FASB 1990,
1IH2).

Concerns Regarding Accounting
Under SFAS No. 106
Market Reactions
SFAS No. 106 was a very controversial standard partially because of the perceived
negative effects it would have on the financial statements of companies adopting it. In
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addition, others thought that the negative effects on financial statements would translate
into negative market effects for those adopting firms. Research such as that done by
Espahbodi, et al. (1991) and Young (1993) did find a statistically significant market effect,
giving evidence that these concerns were valid.

Benefit Reductions
Another related concern was that the negative financial statement and market
effects would cause firms to reduce or eliminate other postretirement benefits. Evidence
from the Espahbodi, et al. (1991) and Young (1993) studies as well as that provided by
Smith (1994) supports the assertion that this was valid. Studies examining pension plan
reductions such as Stone (1987), Mittelstaedt (1989), and Thomas (1989) give further
evidence that this was a valid concern. Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) provides the strongest
support for this assertion, as this study found a statistically significant relationship between
the adoption o f SFAS No. 106 and OPEB plan reductions.

Long-term Effects
There is concern that since companies now have to record an accrued liability for
their OPEB obligations, companies will continue to reduce or terminate such plans at an
accelerated rate. The Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) study provides evidence that these fears are
well founded. There appears to be no research in this area to date, however, due partially
to the fact that only a few years have passed since companies adopted SFAS No. 106,
making sufficient data unavailable until now. Sufficient data now exist, allowing work to
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proceed in this area. As more data become available, further studies will likely be done,
some ofwhich will incorporate methodologies not yet possible because of insufficient data.
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CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Capital Structure Research
Mvers and Mailuf U984)
Myers and Majluf examined corporate financing and investment decisions. The
authors found that firms generally found it better to issue safe securities than risky ones.
They also perceived that external financing employing debt is better than financing by
equity. In addition, firms whose investment opportunities exceeded cash flows, and who
had used up their ability to issue low-risk debt have sometimes decided to forego solid
investments rather than issue risky securities to finance them. Additionally, the authors
found that firms tended to build up financial slack by restricting dividends when investment
requirements were modest.
This study appears to be the first to describe what Myers (1984) called a “pecking
order” regarding financing decisions. Although the Myers inquiry did not include the study
of pensions or postretirement benefits, future studies on these topics drew upon their
findings.

13
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Mvers (1984)
Myers examined the question of how companies choose their capital structures. He
came to the following conclusions:
First, firms have good reasons for avoiding issuing common stock and other risky
securities to finance capital investments. They do not want to fall into the dilemma of
either passing up positive-NPV projects3 or issuing stock at a price they perceive as too
low. In addition, firms set target dividend payout ratios so that internally generated funds
will be sufficient to cover normal capital expenditures. The author also found that firms
also restrain themselves in the issuance of debt, so that these levels will remain at a level
deemed safe, thus avoiding material costs associated with financial distress, while allowing
the existence of financial slack in the form of reserve borrowing power.
Since investment opportunities fluctuate relative to internal cash flow, there are
times when the firm exhausts its ability to issue safe debt. When this occurs, such a firm
turns to the least risky securities first. Under such a “pecking order,” observed debt ratios
reflect the cumulative requirement for external financing.
Myers concluded that the higher up the pecking order a firm goes, the greater the
likelihood of incurring costs related to financial distress, thus increasing the likelihood that
positive-NPV investments would be avoided. Accordingly, financial slack (in the form of
borrowing power) can be regarded as valuable, and firms will take steps to acquire it.
Myers has mentioned the issuance of stock as one way to acquire slack. He did not
3NPV refers to net present value. Net present value projects are those that are expected to provide
a rate of return on invested funds that exceeds the cost of the invested funds.

Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

15
mention pension plan asset liquidation as a source of financial slack but this possibility has
been addressed in some of the pension related research. This will be reviewed in the next
section.

Pension Research

Stone (1987)
Drawing upon the analytical framework o f Myers and Majluf (1984), Stone
addressed the question of whether overfunded pension plan terminations could be
explained as financing decisions. At the time of her study, the tax laws encouraged
overfunding, and there were few legal restrictions on plan terminations. In fact, there were
no tax penalties on them during the period studied (1982-1984).
In her study, Stone examined 214 firms, and using multivariate statistical analysis,
found the model to be significant at the .001 level. The design had a classificatory accuracy
of 81.25 percent, suggesting that pension plan terminations were, at least to a large extent,
financing decisions.
These findings support the assertion that management has the flexibility of
accumulating financial slack in the form of pension fund assets, and that this restraint is
more likely to be drawn upon when (1) the firm generates a smaller proportion of its
resources internally, (2) the market assigns a lower value to its cash flows, and (3) the firm
has incentives to avoid additional debt financing. The results are consistent with a
financing explanation for overfunded plan terminations.
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Mittelstaedt (1989*1
Mittelstaedt attempted to explain firms’ decisions to reduce overfunding of defined
benefit pension plans, either quickly through legal terminations or more slowly through
actuarial adjustments. He hypothesized that:
Both terminators and contractors experience financial weakness prior to reducing
pension funding. Terminators experience greater financial weakening than
contractors.
His premise was based upon the above mentioned studies by Myers (1984) and Myers and
Majluf (1984), which found evidence suggesting that when a firm’s cash needs exceed
those generated from operations, the firm follows a “pecking order” in choosing the means
of financing.
Mittelstaedt’s final sample consisted o f 52 terminator firms, 47 contractor firms,
and 59 maintainers. Using univariate analysis, he found evidence that terminators were
significantly weaker financially than maintainers and that terminators were financially
weaker three years prior to termination. Terminators were also found to be more
susceptible to takeover, and terminators exhibited declines in marginal tax rates
(suggesting a significant decrease in earnings or increased losses). Contractors were also
financially weaker than maintainers three years prior to plan reductions. These contractors
were also significantly more likely to have declines in marginal tax rates than maintainers.
As expected, values for contractors fell between those for terminators and maintainers.
Logit model analysis results were consistent with those he found by univariate
analysis. Overall, the evidence suggested that contractor and terminator firms were
financially weaker than maintainers. In addition, the marginal tax rate variable indicated
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that contractors and terminators were more likely to have declines in marginal tax rates
prior to contractions or terminations.
Mittelstaedt’s results provide evidence that firms reduce pension assets to meet
cash needs after experiencing capital constraints. Based upon Mittelstaedt’s study as well
as prior ones, it does appear that when cash requirements are high and firms experience
severe financial weakening, they are much more likely to terminate plans. But when cash
needs and financial weakening are less serious, they are more likely to reduce their plans.

Thomas (1989)
Thomas also sought to understand why firms terminate overfunded pension plans.
He discussed three alternative explanations. First, excess pension plan assets represent a
source of financial slack and are withdrawn by firms facing an unexpected decline in
available funds. Second, reversions expropriate wealth from workers since firms renege
on an implicit promise to pay pension benefits that vest later in a worker’s career. Third,
for firms anticipating financial distress, asset reversions allow wealth transfers to
stockholders from lenders and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).
Based upon the work of Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), Thomas
developed a financial slack hypothesis. He predicted that both slow withdrawals and plan
terminations would follow unexpected declines in funds from operations and/or increases
in profitable investment opportunities.
Thomas obtained a sample of 611 plans, which represented 514 completed
terminations and 97 proposed terminations. Thomas found evidence that terminating firms
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fell into three general groups: (1) terminations unassociated with control changes,
(2) terminations followed by hostile attempts to change control, and (3) terminations
following friendly control changes.
The financial slack explanation appeared to be the most likely rationale for all
terminations (with and without control changes). Excess pension assets represent financial
slack, and slow withdrawals and terminations represent liquidation of such slack.
Continued declines in available funds that exhaust the stock of preferred sources of slack
were found to be associated with terminations.

OPEB Research
Askren (1991)
Askren sought to estimate the unobservable OPEBs obligation for a sample o f 100
firms for the years 1987,1988, and 1989. This obligation is considered unobservable, since
the market values of assets and liabilities are unobservable and because book values are
recorded at historical cost rather than at market value. The author developed three models:
one attempted to identify the components ofthe market value o f assets (MVA), one tried
to identify the elements that define the market value of liabilities (MVL), and one that
endeavored to identify the variables closely associated with the level of the OPEBs
obligation. The OPEBs obligation is one of the components of MVL.
Askren hypothesized that an increase in the OPEBs obligation would, in turn,
increase the market's assessment of the liabilities of the firm, as the OPEBs obligation
represents off-balance sheet debt and should have a direct effect on the market value of
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the firm's liabilities. Through the use of a two-stage least squares regression, Askren
determined that, as expected, the OPEBs obligation was positively and significantly
associated with the market value of liabilities for all three years of her study. These results
were consistent with the market's assessment of the OPEBs obligation as a financial
responsibility of the firm, despite its absence from the balance sheet.
Askren also found that the OPEBs obligation coefficients increased during the
period examined, which she suggested might have been caused by the increased awareness
of them. During 1988, the press reported the FASB proposal to accrue other
postemployment benefits. This drew attention to the extremely large potential liability
firms had accumulated but had left unrecorded. Askren felt that if this unrecorded liability
was incorporated into stock prices, it could explain the increased size of the OPEBs
coefficient.

Espahbodi. Strock. and
Tehranian (1991)
This paper examined the impact of nine pronouncements on equity prices as they
related to the (then) proposed SFAS No. 106. The theories used by the authors in
formulating their hypotheses were presented by Watts and Zimmerman (1986): (1) the
contracting cost hypothesis, which maintains that stock prices may decline as a proposed
accounting standard increases the probability that debt covenants will be violated and thus
increases the anticipated cost of a technical default and (2) the political cost hypothesis.
which asserts that the announcement of such an accounting change might result in stock
price increases, especially for larger firms, due to the reduction of political costs. Based
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upon previous studies, [e.g., Collins, Rozeff, and Dhaliwal (1981) and Lys (1984)],
Espahbodi et al., expected a positive impact from the reduction of political costs which
would be outweighed, on average, by the negative effect of increased contracting costs.
A total of 143 firms were examined. Using Pearson correlation, the authors found
support for the suggestion that the pre-SFAS No. 106 accounting procedure was related
to firm size, a point consistent with the assertion that large firms use income-reducing
alternatives [Watts and Zimmerman (1986)]. They also found support for the claim that
the proposal to force accrual of OPEBs obligations would have a significant impact on
firm's financial statements. Furthermore, they suggested a negative stock price impact with
the issuance o f the Exposure Draft, which would be more significant for firms with high
debt-ratios. These findings support their contracting cost hypothesis.

Amir (1993)
Amir analyzed the valuation implications of firms' OPEBs obligations. The study
examined investors' assessments of disclosed postretirement benefit (PRB) cash payments
prior to SFAS No. 106. He also inquired as to whether a measure of the PRB obligation4
is regarded as value-relevant by investors in addition to the disclosed cash payments.
Amir used 1990 COMPUSTAT data for the period of 1984-1990. Sample sizes
ranged from 243 in 1984 to 313 in 1990. This study used a valuation model that relates
the value o f a firm to the information provided in its income statement and balance sheet.
Amir adopted the model derived by Ohlson (1991) that relates equity value to both
4 PRB obligation is synonymous with OPEB obligation.
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accounting earnings and book value of equity. This analysis was conducted in two stages.
First, a measure of the PRB liability was examined to see if it was value-relevant. This was
done in addition to cash payments information. Second, accounting numbers were adjusted
so that earnings and book values included the estimated present values of the PRB
obligation. The cash information was examined to see if it was value-relevant to investors
in addition to extant liability information.
Amir's results indicate that, over the period of 1987-1990, there was a change in
investors' assessment of the PRB obligation. His observation is consistent with that o f
Askiren (1991) who found a similar change in the OPEBs coefficient.
The results from this study suggest that investors had changed their assessment of
the PRB obligation over the period o f 1984-1990 from a position of underestimation
during 1984-1986 to realization of the large size of the present value of the expected PRB
liability during 1987-1990. The PRB obligation was found to be value-relevant to investors
in addition to the cash payments which were found not to be value-relevant when the
accounting numbers were adjusted to reflect the estimated PRB obligation. His findings
indicate that a measure of the PRB obligation based upon publicly available information
prior to the implementation of SFAS No. 106 was more informative than the cash
information. This finding supports the FASB's position that accrual of the postretirement
liability (as mandated by SFAS No. 106) is necessary.
As mentioned by the author, the study was limited because, at the time of the
study, very few firms had adopted SFAS No. 106. This made it virtually impossible to fully
validate the estimates of the PRB liability.
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Leaubv. Ugras. and Welsh
(1993)
The aim of this study was to determine whether the early adoption of SFAS No.
106 by sample firms represented earnings management. The authors examined 64 firms
that had adopted SFAS No. 106 early.
Firms that elected to adopt SFAS No. 106 early had significantly lower earnings in
the year of adoption than in the prior year. That finding is consistent with the "big bath"
theory, which maintains that companies will “take a bath” in order to get the bad news out
all at once.
In addition, most firms (59 o f64) elected immediate recognition ofthe cumulative
effect of the accounting change. Also, some firms chose to record other nonrecurring
charges, which further reduced their profitability in the year of adoption. Altogether, these
accounting charges help substantiate the assertion that those firms that adopted SFAS No.
106 early intended to show as much bad news as possible during a period of declining
profits.

Smith (1994)
Smith examined whether previous academic research could have been used by the
FASB ex ante to the issuance of SFAS No. 106 in order to predict the extent to which the
management of financially weak firms might defer recognition of the OPEB expense and
the related transition obligation. Smith sought to establish whether a firm's financial
condition could be statistically associated with a decision to adopt an income-reducing
accounting standard before the mandatoiy adoption date. The author also examined

Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23

whether a given firm's financial position was statistically related to management's choice
regarding the transition alternative (i.e., choosing immediate or deferred expensing of the
transition obligation).
Smith’s sample consisted of 200 firms, distributed over 38 two-digit SIC codes.
Rate-regulated and capital-regulated industries were excluded, due to fixed return on
investment and minimum capital requirements, which would bias observed ratios.
Using Fisher's exact probability test, he also found support for the assertion that
the probability o f the early adoption of SFAS No. 106 was significantly higher for
financially strong firms (based on profitability) than for financially weak ones. In addition,
he found that the likelihood of management choosing immediate recognition of the
transition obligation was significantly higher for more profitable firms than for the less
profitable companies. The probability, however, o f management choosing immediate
recognition of the transition obligation was insignificantly higher for more solvent firms
than for less solvent ones.
This study provides further evidence that financial weakness motivates
management decisions.

Mittelstaedt. Nichols, and
Regier(1995)
The purpose of this inquiry was to determine the prevalence, magnitude, and timing
o f retiree health care benefit reductions and to identify their determinants. The authors
explored three explanations for such benefit reductions: (1) increased contracting costs due
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to the adoption of SFAS No. 106, (2) financial weakness independent ofthe standard and
(3) firm-specific increases in retiree health care costs.
Mittelstaedt et al. developed and tested three hypotheses. The first one was based
upon the assertions of the contracting cost hypothesis, which maintains that stock prices
may decline as proposed accounting standards increase the probability that debt covenants
will be violated.
H 1: Firms which reduce retiree health care coverage have higher leverage before
considering the effects of SFAS No. 106 and/or experience greater increases
in leverage from SFAS No. 106 than other firms prior to reducing it.
The second hypothesis was based upon prior research [Majluf (1984)] that found
that financially weak firms liquidate financial slack when internally generated cash flows
are less than needed. Furthermore, [Mittelstaedt (1989) and Thomas (1989)] have shown
that overfunded pension plans can be viewed as sources of such slack. These studies found
that only financially weak firms draw on overfunded pension plans (when other sources
o f capital have been exhausted). The second hypothesis stated:
H2: Firms that reduce retiree health care coverage are financially weaker than
other firms prior to reducing it.
The third hypothesis was based upon the fact that although health care costs have
risen due to demographic factors, increases in health care cost inflation rates and decreases
in Medicare coverage, some firms have been impacted more than others (Rappaport and
Malone 1993, 25). The third hypothesis stated:
H3: Firms which reduce retiree health care coverage experience greater specific
increases in health care costs than other firms prior to reduction of coverage.
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The sample consisted o f202 firms, 71 of which reduced health care benefits, and
131 of which did not. Most o f those that had reduced benefits did so either by capping
expenditures or increasing copayments. The authors did not find a clear ordinal
relationship between the type and severity of benefits cut.
After performing a univariate analysis, Mittelstaedt et al. found indications that
benefit-cut firms had significantly higher interaction variable values than no-cut firms.
These observations support the contracting cost hypothesis (which was the basis for
Hypothesis 1), as they suggest that managers cut health care benefits partly because ofthe
adverse financial reporting effect of SFAS No. 106 on debt covenants.
The authors found support for the financial weakness hypothesis, and, therefore,
Hypothesis 2. The support, however, was not as strong as it was with the pension
terminators or pension contractors reported by Mittelstaedt (19S9) and Thomas (1989).
Logit models were used to test the third hypothesis. The results of the multivariate
analysis were consistent with those found with the univariate analysis. The results also
indicated that financial weakness influences the benefit-cut decisions. Firm-specific
increases in health care costs appear not to play a significant role in explaining such
benefit-cut decisions.
Overall, the results suggest that there is a strong associative relationship between
the decision to cut retiree health care benefits and increased contracting cost created by
the requirement to adopt SFAS No. 106. This, the authors maintain, suggests that SFAS
No. 106 provoked managerial actions regarding the timing of cuts in retiree health care
benefits. The authors' results also suggest that the adoption (or anticipated adoption) of
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SFAS No. 106 is a major factor in OPEB reduction decisions. But adoption of SFAS No.
106 was not the only factor. Mittelstaedt et al. found support for the financial weakness
hypothesis, suggesting that firms in weakened financial condition were more likely to
liquidate pension assets or reduce other postretirement benefits when less costly sources
of capital became unavailable.

Summary
This study is an extension of the research outlined above. The studies by Askren
(1991) and Amir (1993) provide evidence of the importance of accruing the OPEB
obligation. Both determined that the market considered the OPEB obligation as a
responsibility of the firm even before it was on the balance sheet. Additionally, the fact that
value-relevance o f the OPEB obligation appeared to increase dramatically when accrual
of this liability became imminent indicated the importance of this issue for investors.
A financial weakness hypothesis will be used in this study since there is
considerable support for the use of financial weakness as a variable. This can be related to
Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984), who discovered that firms generally restrict
dividends or take other steps to maintain financial slack. A firm with ample financial slack
will be able to acquire funds more cheaply and avoid costs associated with financial
weakness. Thus, it is considered valuable for the firm. Furthermore, support for the use
of a financial weakness variable is found in the study done by Stone (1987). This
investigation found that pension plan reductions were financing decisions, and she also
noted that the liquidation of excess pension assets was one way to acquire financial slack.
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Mittelstaedt (1989) discovered that firms terminating pension plans generally were weaker
financially than those that maintained them. And Thomas (1989) found that financial slack
was the most likely reason for all pension plan terminations. Such pension plan research
is relevant to the current study. With pensions there are assets used to fund such plans.
When firms have an increased need for financial slack, but have exhausted cheaper forms
o f it, they may liquidate pension plan assets. If their financial strength decreases further,
they may now elect to reduce or terminate them. Since most postretirement benefit
obligations are unfunded, there are no assets to liquidate, so the first step would be to
reduce these benefits. Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) extended this assertion regarding
postretirement benefits and discovered that financial weakness was related to reductions
and terminations of OPEBs. This provides considerable support for the use of financial
weakness as a variable.
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CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY
Pilot Study
This investigation was undertaken to determine whether data would be both readily
available and accessible and to determine the optimal sample size to be used in the final
study. Additionally, defects were worked out of statistical formulas and error detection
methods were developed to aid in minimizing data errors. This pilot study will be referred
to throughout Chapter 3 and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
The source for financial statement data for this inquiry (and for the final study as
well) was the SEC’s Edgar Database which contains financial statements from all publicly
held firms since they must report this information to the SEC. The Edgar database
provides full disclosure of information for publicly held firms in the United States. The
data were taken from the 10-K reports. Using a random number generator, firms were
drawn using the SEC’s company ID numbers. Then, the number was matched with the
SEC record bearing it. Data for the fiscal years 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996 were taken
from those 10-K filings. Since there might be some variation from year to year, it was
advisable to examine several years' data. For example, the effect of the OPEB liability

28
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might change over several years, particularly since for most firms, 1994 was the first year
this liability appeared on the balance sheet.

Description and Justification of Variables
Dependent Variable:
CHG =

Dependent variable. Indicator variable coded 0 for no change and 1 for
change (reduction or termination of OPEBs).

Independent Variables:
TD/TA =

Total Debt/Total Assets—financial weakness variable.

NI/TA =

After-Tax Net Income/Total Assets—financial weakness variable.

OCF/TA =

Operating Cash Flows/Total Assets—financial weakness variable.

TL/TA =

Total Liabilities/Total Assets—alternative financial weakness variable.

APBO/TA =

Accumulated Postretirement Benefit Obligation (APBO)/Total Assets
Measures the OPEB liability relative to total assets.

CAP/TA =

Change in the OPEB liability (APBO/TA) from the previous year to
the current year.

INTI =

Interaction variable—(TD/TA) * (APBO/TA)—interaction between
total debt and the OPEB liability.

INT2 =

Interaction variable—[Inverse of (NI/TA) * (APBO/TA)]—interaction
between the level of net income and the OPEB liability.

INT3 =

Interaction variable—[Inverse of (OCF/TA) * APBO/TA]—interaction
between the levels of cash flow and the OPEB liability.

INT4 =

Interaction variable—(TL/TA) * (APBO/TA)—interaction between
the relationship of liabilities to assets and the OPEB liability.
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Three variables are used to measure financial weakness: Total debt to total assets,
after-tax income from continuing operations to total assets, and cash flow from operations
to total assets.
An alternative weakness variable is being used to compare the predictive ability o f
the TD/TA with that o f TL/TA. The TD/TA variable is specifically defined as total debt
plus capital lease payments divided by total assets. It should be a better predictor of
changes in OPEBs than the TL/TA variable since the total debt variable more directly
measures a firm’s ability to obtain relatively inexpensive sources of capital. Additionally,
since the OPEB liability is included in total liabilities, the TD/TA is a better variable as it
prevents them from overlapping.
All sample firms have adopted SFAS No. 106. Accordingly, the information now
extant allows one to examine the relationship between the postretirement benefit obligation
and OPEB plan reductions. APBO/TA, a continuous variable, is used to measure the
obligation mandated by this accounting standard. And while Mittelstaedt et al. (199S) used
the adoption of SFAS No. 106 as a variable, this inquiry will instead employ the OPEB
liability that the adoption o f this standard created.
The interaction variables were developed to determine whether the interaction
between the OPEB liability and any of the financial weakness variables has a stronger
predictive ability than any of these variables do individually. Although each individual
financial weakness variable may have some predictive ability, the predictive ability may be
better if that financial weakness variable is combined with the OPEB liability, which may
itself have predictive ability. The justification for including interaction variables is based
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upon the postulation that the effects of the variables are multiplicative and not simply
additive. For instance, assume one variable would increase the probability o f OPEB
reductions by 10 percent, while another variable would increase this probability by 12
percent. However, if the two were combined, the probability of OPEB reductions might
be 60 percent, which is clearly far above the sum of the effects of the individual variables.
The first interaction variable, INTI, attempts to determine if the interaction
between the debt ratio (TD/TA) and the OPEB liability helps explain the differences in the
group means better than either variable would individually. As Mittelstaedt et al. (199S)
determined, there was a relationship between the debt ratio and OPEB plan reductions.
Additionally, there was a relationship between the SFAS No. 106 adoption and the OPEB
plan reductions. In this study, the OPEB liability is used in place of the SFAS No. 106
adoption. It is logical, therefore, to assume that there might be a statistically significant
relationship between the debt ratio and OPEB reductions and that there also might be a
significant relationship between the OPEB liability and these reductions. For instance, a
firm may consider reducing coverage if their debt ratio increases. The firm may also
consider reducing coverage if the OPEB liability increases. If the debt ratio increases and
the OPEB liability increases, this combination of events may be enough to trigger the
decision to reduce postretirement benefits. Therefore, an interaction variable was created
to help determine whether these two variables taken together have a stronger predictive
ability than the two variables would individually.
INT2 represents the interaction between profitability (NI/TA) and the OPEB
liability. It is logical to assume that there might be a statistically significant relationship
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between profitability and OPEB reductions and, furthermore, that there might also be a
significant relationship between the OPEB liability and those reductions. A firm may
consider reducing coverage if profitability declines. The firm may also consider reducing
coverage if the OPEB liability increases. If profitability declines and the OPEB liability
increases, this combination of events may be enough to trigger the decision to reduce
postretirement benefits. Thus, a second interaction variable was created.
INT3 demonstrates the interaction between operating cash flows (OCF/TA) and
OPEB liability. It is logical to assume that there might be a statistically significant
relationship between cash flow and OPEB reductions. It also is reasonable to suspect that
there is an important relationship between OPEB liability and those reductions. A firm may
consider reducing coverage if cash flow declines. The firm may also consider reducing
coverage if the OPEB liability increases. If cash flow declines and the OPEB liability
increases, this combination of events may be enough to trigger the decision to reduce
postretirement benefits. Accordingly, a third interaction variable was created.
INT4 is the same as INTI except that it uses TL/TA in lieu of TD/TA. It is
probable that this variable is less strong than INTI. The TD/TA variable specifically
considers debt and capital lease payments and not total liabilities. This variable was
included so that this assumption could be investigated.
All variables were lagged one year in the pilot study and in the final one as well.
There was a very significant difference in the classificatory power of the lagged versus
non-lagged variables. Firms are likely to make decisions based upon the results of the
previous period so it is not surprising to find that lagging variables often enhances their
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predictive ability, as was the case with the Mittelstaedt et al. study. Additionally, the
Mittelstaedt et al. research found increased statistical significance when interactions were
used.

Statement of Hypotheses
Discriminant analysis was used in this pilot study to determine the relationship
between OPEB reduction decisions and several groups of independent variables. These
latter included the OPEB liability variables, financial weakness variables, and the funding
level of OPEB plans, dividend level variables, firm age, and firm size. Data were collected
for five years (1993, 1994, 1995,1996, and 1997). In the final study, the period 1994-97
was analyzed though not all the 1997 data were available at the time the pilot study was
done. This period (1993-96) represents the first four-year period in which SFAS No. 106
had been in effect for all adopters of that statement. The period of 1994-1996 also was
analyzed, but 1993 data were necessary to create lagged variables for 1994. The following
hypotheses were tested in the pilot study and in the final study.
Hypothesis 1 is as follows:
Ho:

There is no significant statistical relationship between any of the financial
weakness variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.

Ha:

There is a significant statistical relationship between at least one of the
financial weakness variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.

Hypothesis 2 is as follows:
Ho:

There is no significant statistical relationship between the level of the
OPEB liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
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Ha:

There is a significant statistical relationship between the level of the OPEB
liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.

Hypothesis 3 is as follows:
Ho:

There is no significant statistical relationship between the change in the
level of the OPEB liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.

Ha:

There is a significant statistical relationship between the change in the level
of the OPEB liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.

Hypothesis 4 is as follows:
Ho:

There is no significant statistical relationship between any ofthe interaction
variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.

Ha:

There is a significant statistical relationship between at least one of the
interaction variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.

The first hypothesis is similar to the first one used by Mittelstaedt et at. (1995). The
second one is similar to the SFAS No. 106 adoption hypothesis used by Mittelstaedt et al.
except that it examines the relationship between OPEB reductions and the OPEB liability
under SFAS No. 106 instead of adoption o f the standard. The third hypothesis is an
extension o f the second one and is used to determine whether a change in the OPEB
liability from one year to the next is related to OPEB plan reductions. The fourth and final
hypothesis explores the possibility of interactions between several key variables (see
variable description section).

Use of Discriminant Analysis
Two-group discriminant analysis was used in this study since the dependent
variable is categorical while the independent variables are continuous. There are two
groups into which firms may fall: (1) No-change firms (firms which did not reduce
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OPEBs), (2) Change firms (firms that did reduce OPEBs). Two group discriminant
analysis involves derivation of the linear combination of independent variables that can best
discriminate between observations in these defined groups. Discriminant analysis multiplies
each independent variable by an appropriate weight and adds these products together. The
analysis results in a single composite discriminant score for each firm in the analysis. By
averaging the discriminant scores for all the firms, it is possible to obtain a group mean
(called a centroid). The centroids indicate the most typical location of a firm within a
particular group, and a comparison of the group centroids tells how far apart these are
along the dimension being tested.
The test for statistical significance of the discriminant function is a generalized
measure ofthe distance between the two group centroids. This is calculated by comparing
the distribution of the discriminant scores for the two groups. If the overlap is small, the
discriminant function separates them well. If, however, the overlap is large, then the
function only poorly discriminates between these groups.
Assumptions for derivation ofthe discriminant function are multivariate normality
ofthe populations and unknown (but equal) dispersion and covariance structures for the
groups. When classification accuracies are determined, one may also assume equal costs
of misclassification, equal a priori group probabilities, and known dispersion and
covariation structures. Discriminant analysis is not so sensitive to violations o f these
assumptions unless, of course, such violations are extreme. Discriminant analysis is even
less sensitive to such violations when a large sample size is used.
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The main objectives of discriminant analysis are as follows:
1. To establish procedures for classifying statistical units (firms) into groups on
the basis of their scores on several independent variables, and
2. To determine which of the independent variables account for most of the
differences in the average score profiles of the two groups.
Accordingly, discriminant analysis is the most appropriate technique for use in this
study, which attempts to classify firms into two groups (change and no-change).
Two software packages were employed in this analysis. Those same packages were
used in the main study. The first was Minitab for Windows and the second was NCSS.
They both gave the same results, although NCSS allowed for the use of stepwise
discriminant analysis. Accordingly, this is the package from which these findings have been
printed. The stepwise feature also allows one to automate the procedure of adding and
deleting independent variables from the model. Variables are entered into the model when
they are significant. If a variable becomes insignificant in the presence of the other
variables in the model, however, it is removed. This method maximizes the F-value of the
entire model and thereby provides the most efficient group of variables for purposes of
classification.

Summary
The complete model used for the pilot study may be specified as follows:
CHG =

CO + C 1*TD/TA + C2*NI/TA + C3 *OCF/TA + C4*TL/TA +
C5*APBO/TA + C6*CAP/TA + C7*INT1 + C8*INT2 + C9*INT3 +
C10*INT4

Where:
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Dependent Variable:
CHG = Indicator variable coded 0 for no change and 1 for change (reduction or
termination of OPEBs).
Independent Variables:
TD/TA = Total Debt/Total Assets—financial weakness variable.
NI/TA = After-Tax Net Income/Total Assets—financial weakness variable.
OCF/TA = Operating Cash Flows/Total Assets—financial weakness variable.
TL/TA = Total Liabilities/Total Assets—alternative financial weakness variable.
APBO/TA = Accumulated Postretirement Benefit Obligation (APBO)/Total Assets
Measures the OPEB liability relative to total assets.
CAP/TA = Change in the OPEB liability (APBO/TA) from the previous year to the
current year.
INT1 = Interaction variable—(TD/TA) * (APBO/TA)—interaction between total
debt and the OPEB liability.
INT2 = Interaction variable—[Inverse of (NI/TA) * (APBO/TA)]—interaction
between the level of net income and the OPEB liability.
INT3 = Interaction variable—[Inverse of (OCF/TA) * APBO/TA]—interaction
between the levels o f cash flow and the OPEB liability.
INT4 = Interaction variable—(TL/TA) * (APBO/TA)—interaction between the
relationship of liabilities to assets and the OPEB liability.

Sample Selection
The sample used in the pilot study consisted of 125 firms which remained after
those in rate regulated industries were eliminated. As described by Smith (1994) and
Mittelstaedt, et al. (1995), the treatment of utilities’ health care costs is regulated by state
commissions. Their rates are also regulated and this, in turn, greatly narrows the possible
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earnings range, which violates the underlying assumption that the firms operate in a free
market. Additionally, the financial ratios of utilities and financial institutions are much
different from those of firms in other industries. Since financial weakness is believed to be
highly correlated with OPEB reductions, it was necessary to discard these firms from the
sample.
After excluding utilities and financial institutions, firms not offering OPEBs were
discarded, thus reducing the final sample size to 42,45, and 45 for 1994, 1995, and 1996
respectively. For three of those firms, there were no data available for 1993. This made
lagging of variables impossible for 1994. Accordingly, these three were dropped from the
analysis for that year. Of the sampled firms, however, 6 had benefit reductions with 2
occurring in each year. The fact that out of 125 films only 45 offered OPEBs is consistent
with research which found that the adoption of SFAS No. 106 was statistically significant
in explaining OPEB reductions and terminations. Earlier information suggested that a
much higher percentage of firms offered OPEBs.
Given the small proportion of change firms found in the holdout sample, a
collection o f 1,632 firms will be used for the final study. This is based upon the following
formula for computing necessary sample size:

Z 2p ( \ - p )
E2

Where:
Z = z score based upon a significance level of .05
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p = proportion o f change firms to total firms
E = error

The calculation is as follows:

(1.96)2.044444(.955556)
( 01)2

Which yields:

(3.8416)(.042469)
.0001

This gives us n:

1631.492 =

.1631492
.0001

The error (E) is set at 1 percent. If this had been 2 percent, the necessary sample
size would be only 408 firms. Changing the error to 1 percent, however, requires instead
a sample size of 1,632 firms. Given the accuracy of a 1 percent error compared with that
of a 2 percent error, it appears that the increased sample size is needed. If the current
proportion of change firms to total firms holds for the larger sample, one would expect
that the number of change firms would be approximately 72 for each year. On the other
hand, if the sample were only 408 firms, the number of change firms instead would be 18,
which would be quite small. The final sample, however, did not consist o f 1,632 firms. The
reasons for this are stated below.
The proportion o f change to total firms was extremely small in the sample used for
the pilot study. It was assumed that this same proportion existed in the large sample. The
small proportion of change firms could have been responsible for some of the decreased
classificatory power of the discriminant analysis used in the pilot study. In the pilot study
sample, only two change firms were found in the sample of 45 (2 out of 42 for 1994).
Therefore, someone could simply assume that all firms were no-change firms, and he or
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she would be more than 95 percent accurate! When the prior probabilities are so skewed,
it could cause the discriminant analysis to lose some of its ability to separate individual
observations into groups. To combat this potential problem, the sample of non-change
firms was systematically reduced. This would have resulted in a final sample of
approximately 450 to 500 firms. The proportion of change to no-change firms would have
been approximately 15 percent, which would be somewhat less skewed than the
proportion in the sample used in the pilot study. As explained in Chapter 5, the final
sample was much smaller than the proposed 450 to 500 firms.
All firms in the utility and financial services industries were eliminated from the
sample in the pilot study. They were, of course, removed from the main sample as well.
As was the case in the pilot study, firms were selected which do not offer postretirement
benefits at all, and they were eliminated. Thus, they were not considered in the size of the
total sample.
Since financial statement data are often restated in subsequent years, the most
recent data will be used for all years. For example, both 1997 and 1996 data will be taken
from the 1997 comparative financial statements, while 1995 data will be taken from the
1996 comparative financial statements, and so on. Not all of the fiscal years end
simultaneously (e.g., December 31). This, however, should not be a problem here, as there
were no major economic shifts during the period examined. The data were not stratified
by industry since there were so few change firms during this time frame.
A random sample of firms was taken from the SEC’s Edgar database using a
random number generator. The sample size of 125 was used for the pilot study. It was
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inevitable, of course, that some of the firms do (or did not) offer OPEBs. These
observations would be automatically eliminated. Similar sampling procedures were used
in the final study.

Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS FROM THE PILOT STUDY
Significance of the Preliminary Findings
Since discriminant analysis is used to classify data into groups, the first step is to
determine if the means of the two groups are statistically significantly different. If they are
not, discriminant analysis will be unable to determine accurately the group into which a
particular observation fits.
Therefore, means tests were performed on all independent variables for the two
groups for each year. The variables for which the means were significantly different were
also determined to have explanatory power in the final models for each year, as shown
below.
Analysis was done using prior probabilities that were determined based upon the
sample used in the pilot study. First, the probability o f a firm being represented in group
0 (no change) was assumed to be .95 and the probability of a firm being represented in
group 1 (change) was assumed to be .05. The justification for the use of these prior
probability figures was the proportion of change firms to total firms in the sample. There
were only two change firms out of a total of 45 firms (42 firms for 1994). This proportion
was rounded to .05, providing the prior probability of a firm being in group 1.
42
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Preliminary findings support the assertion that, for 1994, there is a statistically
significant relationship between INTI and OPEB reductions.
Hypothesis 1 is as follows:
Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between any of the financial
weakness variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between at least one o f the
financial weakness variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
The cash flow variable is not significant at the .05 level, but the interaction variable
measuring the interaction of after-tax income and OPEB liability is significant at this
confidence level. The OPEB liability variable by itself is not significant, nor is the NI/TA
variable. Using .05 as the critical level of confidence, we fail to reject the null hypothesis
for hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 is as follows:
Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between the level of the OPEB
liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between the level o f the OPEB
liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
For hypothesis 2, we also fail to reject the null hypothesis, since the OPEB
liability is, by itself, not significant.
Hypothesis 3 is as follows:
Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between the change in the level
o f the OPEB liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between the change in the level
o f the OPEB liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
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The null hypothesis for hypothesis 3 is not rejected since the change in the OPEB
liability does not appear to have a statistically significant relationship with OPEB reduction
decisions.
Hypothesis 4 is as follows:
Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between any of the interaction
variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha:

There is a significant statistical relationship between at least one of the
interaction variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.

The null hypothesis is rejected in the case of hypothesis 4 since one of the
interaction variables is significant at the .05 level (see Table 2). In fact, this suggests that
there may be a significant relationship between the interaction of cash flow level and both
OPEB liability level and OPEB reductions. The cash flow variable by itself was not
significant at the .05 level (see Table 2). On the other hand, there might be a significant
relationship between after-tax income and OPEB liability levels when the interaction of
both variables is considered. Overall, the predictive ability o f the significant variables is
accurate, as 41 ofthe 42 observations were classified correctly (see Table 1). The one firm
that was misclassified (observation 3) had values for all variables that were statistically
insignificantly different from the means for group 0, so discriminant analysis was unable
to classify it correctly as a member of group 1. This may be attributable to the small
sample size.
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There appears to be a much stronger statistical relationship between several
variables and the OPEB reductions for 1995. In fact, all the interaction variables as well
as the OPEB liability variables are significant at the .05 level (see Table 4). None of the
financial weakness variables, however, are significant by themselves. Given these results,
it would appear that the OPEB liability was the trigger for such reductions. Certainly when
combined with financial weakness variables, the statistical relationship appears even more
significant. Since none of the financial weakness variables are significant by themselves,
we fail to reject the null hypothesis for hypothesis 1. All OPEB variables and all interaction
variables appear to be significant, so we can reject the null hypothesis for hypotheses 2,
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3, and 4. The significant variables for 1995 classified all 45 observations correctly (see
Table 3).

lilllll
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^
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45

I
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5.0
605.7
504.8
11.4
13.4

PROB. > F
.0315
<.0000
<.0000
.0017
.0008

For 1996, however, relationships were considerably weaker. There does appear to
be a weak relationship between cash flows and OPEB reductions though it was not strong
enough to be significant at the .05 level. Accordingly, we fail to reject the null hypothesis
for hypothesis 1. Furthermore, since there are no other variables with statistically
significant relationships, we also fail to reject the null hypothesis for hypotheses 2, 3, and
4. The classificatory power of the cash flow variable was not particularly strong. This may
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be attributable to the small size of the sample. Both firms in group 1 were mis-classified.
Analysis of the data revealed that the values of all variables for these two firms were
statistically insignificantly different from the means for group 0, so discriminant analysis
was unable to classify them correctly as members of group 1.
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Overall, there does appear to be a relationship between OPEB liability levels and
OPEB reductions as well as a relationship between some of the financial weakness
variables and OPEB reductions. At this juncture, it would be logical to conclude that the
wide variation in predictive ability and the exact variables that are related to the reductions
is partially due to the small sample size. Although the sample size of 45 firms (42 for 1994)
is not especially small itself, there were only two change firms for each year in this
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sub-sample. In the final study, the larger sample size was expected to reduce these wide
variations between years. However, since the sample contained a very small percentage
o f change firms, the sample had to be reduced by eliminating many of the no-change firms.
This systematic reduction of ihe sample did reduce the prior probabilities to .50 and .50,
so the results were still more reliable than those from the pilot study where the prior
probabilities were approximately .95 and .05. It appears that the wide variations between
years were largely eliminated in the final study, but it was probably the dramatic reduction
in the prior probabilities that reduced these variations. The primary justification for
stratifying the sample by year was to explore the possibility that the significance of the
OPEB liability had changed overtime, especially since the adoption of SFAS No. 106 itself
was no longer an issue.
During the pilot study, some variables were removed. Originally, there was a
variable comparing the degree of postretirement benefit plan funding to reductions in those
plans. Although there should have been a negative correlation between plan funding and
reductions in those plans, so few o f them were funded that the variable was not
meaningful. This variable was excluded from the final study. Firm size, another variable,
was found to be insignificant since most of the smaller companies appear not to offer
postretirement benefits. The size variable was not expected to be significant and the
findings support that assertion. Additionally, and as expected, the variable TL/TA had a
significantly weaker classificatory power than TD/TA. Similarly, INT4 was much weaker
than INTI. For example, in 1995, all the interaction variables were significant except
INT4.
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The fact that so few firms (45 of 125) actually offered postretirement benefits was
a significant finding by itself. Pre-SFAS No. 106 research suggested that a much higher
percentage of firms offered such benefits than was found in the data search post-SFAS No.
106. This is consistent with the findings of Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) and others who found
that the adoption of this financial accounting standard was a significant factor in OPEB
reductions in periods prior to the one being studied here. Furthermore, a study by the
consulting firm William M. Mercer found that in 1998, the percentage of companies with
at least 500 employees that provide OPEBs has dropped to 36 percent, down from 46
percent in 1993.5 These figures show that OPEB plan reductions continued after the
adoption of SFAS No. 106. One goal of this study was to determine what might have
caused the reductions during this time period.
In addition to the above findings, the pilot study has provided the proportion of
change forms to the total number of firms, greatly simplifying the determination of sample
size needed for the final study.

Limitations of the Pilot Study
The most significant limitation has been the small sample size. Although this has
proven to be a significant restriction in the analysis of the results, it has been instrumental
in determining the sample size to be used in the final study. Another problem is the time
period. At this juncture, it would appear that other methodologies such as those used by

5 “Enrollment in Employee-Sponsored HMO/POS Plans Drops, While Health Plan Costs
Jump 6.1%.” Mercer USA Resource Center, January 26, 1999.
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Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) cannot be utilized here. Those authors lagged some o f the
financial weakness variables three years. Since lagging 1994 would mean using 1991
data, there would be a considerable problem because SFAS No. 106 had not yet been
adopted by all firms. The required date of adoption was for financial statements with
periods ending after December 15,1992. Lagging variables one year increased the model’s
classificatory power, but it will be several years before the three-year lagging can be used.

D iscussion o f the M ain Study
The major difference between the main study and the pilot study was sample size.
Two variables that were used in the pilot study were not put to use in the final study.
These were “weeded out” during the pilot study because of their insignificance. In fact,
they were never included in the model. First, the plan assets (OPEB funding) variable was
nonrelevant due to the extremely small number of firms funding their postretirement
benefit plans. Second, the size variable was insignificant due to the fact that all the firms
in the sample were rather similar in size. Accordingly, the size and plan assets variables
were not used in the main study.
Since the variable TL/TA has shown some classificatory power, it was retained as
will INT4. It is not anticipated that these variables will be kept in the final model, but they
will not be discarded at this time. It is likely that they will be dropped in favor of TD/TA
and INTI. The methodology to be used in the main study will be the same as that
employed in the pilot study except for sample size and the elimination of variables found
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to be irrelevant. The model to be used in the final study is identical to the one used in the
pilot study except that the new prior probabilities are expected to be .85 and .15.

Summary of the Pilot Study* s Findings
The pilot study has shown some evidence supporting the assertion that financial
weakness and the level of OPEB liability are related to a firm’s decision to reduce the level
of postretirement benefits it offers its employees. There, however, is a considerable degree
o f variability between years though this may be attributable, at least in part, to the small
sample size of change firms. Actually, the small number of change firms makes it quite
difficult to draw inferences from the pilot study’s findings.
The small number of firms offering OPEBs relative to the total number of firms
set aside for the pilot study is in itself a significant finding. It supports the expectation that
the adoption o f SFAS No. 106 did have an effect on the decision to reduce or eliminate
postretirement benefits. It also required an increase in the necessary sample size to be used
in the final study.

Preliminary Conclusions Based Upon Pilot Study
There appears to be a weak relationship between both financial weakness and the
level ofthe OPEB liability in the reduction o f postretirement benefits. It may be possible,
o f course, to define these relationships more clearly using a larger sample.
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Implementation of the Pilot Study Revelations
into the Final Study
The results from the pilot study indicated that a number of issues required further
inquiry. First, the variability between years was unlikely to be completely due to the small
sample size in the pilot study, but it may have been the primary cause of such variations.
The prior probabilities were quite extreme in the pilot study, which could have caused
much of the variability as well. Both issues were addressed in the final study, and the
variability between years was found to be considerably smaller. In fact, the variations were
too small to affect the model’s classificatory power significantly.
Second, in the next few years, enough post-SFAS No. 106 adoption data will be
available to allow one to explore other methodologies, including those requiring significant
lagging o f variables. In fact, the ability to lag variables more than one year might be able
to help determine whether OPEB reduction decisions are based on long-term or short-term
trends. For example, if the variables lose explanatory power as they are lagged by more
periods, we might be able to conclude that these decisions are made using only recent
developments rather than from the analysis of a trend that covers several years. This could
not be addressed in the final study since the data were not available at the time the study
was conducted.
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CHAPTER 5

RESULTS FROM THE FINAL STUDY

Introduction
This chapter presents the results of a discriminant analysis of sample data to
determine whether firms can be classified into one of two groups based on financial
weakness and the level of the OPEB liability that must be disclosed in accordance with
SFAS No. 106. Four stages of analysis were performed. First, the full sample was
analyzed. The model exhibited very weak classificatory power, as it classified nearly every
firm in the sample as a no-change firm. The prior probabilities (the probability of an
observation in the actual sample belonging to one group versus the other) were extreme
in the full sample with 97 percent of the firms being no-change firms (98 percent for 1994).
Because of this, discriminant analysis may have lost much of its ability to separate firms
and place them into the proper group. Thus, many of the firms could have been “forced”
into group 0 due to the overwhelming probability that a sample firm would belong to this
group. The fact that several variables were significant at the .05 level despite the model
having very little classificatory power would suggest that either the variables should not
have been significant, or that the model should have possessed better classificatory power.
Therefore, a second analysis was necessary.
53
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In the second analysis, the no-change firms were systematically removed from the
sample so that the prior probabilities would be less extreme. With the reduction of no
change firms, this was lowered to 85 percent for all years except 1994, when they were
90 percent. The results from this second analysis were nearly identical to what was
discovered in the first run of the data. Again, the model classified nearly every firm as a
no-change firm. In addition, several variables again were found to be significant, despite
the model’s lack of classificatory power. This persistent inconsistency in the empirical
results again raised the suspicion that the prior probabilities were causing many of the
firms to be misclassified as no-change firms. Accordingly, steps were taken to force the
prior probabilities into a more reasonable range to see if this indeed was the case.
As a result, a third analysis was performed. In this analysis, each change firm was
taken and matched with a no-change firm of similar size (based on the level of total assets).
This reduced the prior probabilities to exactly .50 and .50, since in this smaller sample,
there was an equal number of change and no-change firms for each year. The results of this
analysis showed that many more firms were being classified as change firms, and the
classificatory power of the model was significantly better than that found in the first two
analyses. Again, several of the variables were found to be significant at the .05 level. This
time, the model’s classificatory ability was consistent with expectations. The model still
misclassified some of the firms, but it was no longer misclassifying a large number of
change firms as no-change ones. It appears that most of the misclassifications were now
due to a somewhat weak relationship between the independent variables and OPEB plan
reductions.
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Finally, since no clearly identifiable year-to-year trends had been discovered, the
data set used in the third analysis was rerun without regard to the year of change. The
results were similar to those found in the third analysis, but the model’s classificatory
power was somewhat diminished. This suggests that the year of change may have some
limited significance, and that there is justification for performing the analysis on a year-byyear basis.
The results of this investigation are somewhat inconsistent with the findings of
prior OPEB and pension research. The results obtained in this study suggest that the
relationships between financial weakness and OPEB plan reductions might have changed
since the adoption of SFAS No. 106. At this point, it appears that both the degree of
financial weakness and the level of the OPEB liability are associated with increased plan
reduction decisions, but not as strongly as they were prior to the adoption of SFAS No.
106. However, further research is necessary to confirm or refute these findings.

Sample Selection in the Final Study
The total number o f firms offering OPEBs at the end of fiscal 1993 was only 588
after deleting rate regulated firms, so this entire group was used in the first stage of the
analysis. All but four of these firms contain data for all five years (1993-1997). There
were 585 usable observations for 1997,588 observations for 1996, and 587 for both 1995
and 1994. There were 18 change firms in both 1997 and 1996, 19 in 1995, and 12 in
1994. The ratio of change firms to the total number of firms is smaller than it was in the
pilot study. The data were gathered from the SEC’s Edgar database.
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For the second analysis, the sample size was reduced to 120 firms in an effort to
bring prior probabilities into a less extreme range. After the second analysis failed to show
any improvement in discriminant analysis’ ability to classify firms, the sample was further
downsized to include only change firms matched with no-change firms of similar size. In
the third analysis, the total sample size was 36 in 1997 and 1996, 38 in 1995, and 24 in
1994.

Variables Used in the Final Study
From the results of the pilot study, the variables TL/TA and the associated
interaction variable, INT4, which was defined as (TL/TA)*(APBO/TA), were dropped
from the model. In the place of these deleted variables, OI/TA (operating income/total
assets) and a new INT4, defined as (inverse of OI/TA)*(APBO/TA), were added. The
operating income/total assets variable was added to determine if the classificatory power
o f a pre-tax income figure would be stronger than that of net income, which is an after-tax
figure. In addition, net income can be affected by extraordinary items along with gains and
losses from discontinued operations and adjustments caused by changes in accounting
methods.
During the data gathering process in this final study, several other variables were
added. During the pilot study, a change variable (CAP/TA) was employed. This variable
was added to determine if a statistically significant relationship existed between the change
in the OPEB liability level from one year to the next and OPEB reduction decisions.
Because there are changes from year-to-year in all the financial weakness variables as well
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as in the OPEB liability, the change variables were expanded to include the year-to-year
changes in the financial weakness variables. Additionally, four new interaction variables
were developed. These new interaction variables are similar to the original four interaction
variables except that the new ones are related to the newly created change variables.
Accordingly, the full model used in this final study was defined as follows:
CHG= CO + C1*TD/TA + C2*NI/TA + C3*OCF/TA + C4*OI/TA +
C5* APBO/TA + C6*CTD/TA + C7*CNI/TA + C8*COCF/TA +
C9*COI/TA + C10*CAP/TA + Cl 1*INT1 + C12*INT2 + C13*INT3 +
C14*INT4 + C15*INT5 + C16*INT6 + C17*INT7 + C18*INT8
Where:
Dependent Variable:
CHG = Indicator variable coded 0 for no change and 1 for change (reduction or
termination of OPEBs).
Independent Variables:
TD/TA = Total Debt/Total Assets—financial weakness variable.
NI/TA = After-Tax Net Income/Total Assets—financial weakness variable.
OCF/TA = Operating Cash Flows/Total Assets—financial weakness variable.
OI/TA = Total Liabilities/Total Assets—alternative financial weakness variable.
APBO/TA = Accumulated Postretirement Benefit Obligation (APBO)/Total Assets
Measures the OPEB liability relative to total assets.
CTD/TA = Change in the first financial weakness variable (TD/T A) from the previous
year to the current year.
CNI/TA = Change in the second financial weakness variable (NI/TA) from the
previous year to the current year.
COCF/TA= Change in the third financial weakness variable (OCF/TA) from the
previous year to the current year.
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COI/TA= Change in the fourth financial weakness variable (OI/TA) from the
previous year to the current year.
CAP/TA = Change in the OPEB liability (APBO/TA) from the previous year to the
current year.
INTI = Interaction variable—(TD/TA) * (APBO/TA)—interaction between total
debt and the OPEB liability.
INT2 = Interaction variable—[Inverse of (NI/TA) * (APBO/TA)]—interaction
between the level of net income and the OPEB liability.
INT3 = Interaction variable—[Inverse of (OCF/TA) * APBO/TA]—interaction
between the levels of cash flow and the OPEB liability.
INT4 = Interaction variable—(Inverse of OI/TA) * (APBO/TA)—interaction
between the relationship of operating income to assets and the OPEB
liability.
INT5 = Interaction variable—(CTD/TA) * (CAP/TA)—interaction between the
change in total debt and the change in the OPEB liability.
INT6 = Interaction variable—[Inverse o f (CNI/TA) * (CAP/TA)]—interaction
between the change in net income and the change in the OPEB liability.
INT7 = Interaction variable—[Inverse of (COCF/TA) * CAP/TA]—interaction
between the change in cash flow and the change in the OPEB liability.
INT8 = Interaction variable—(Inverse of COI/TA) * (CAP/TA)—interaction
between the change in operating income to assets and the change in the
OPEB liability.

Hypotheses Used in the Final Study
For this final study, two additional hypotheses were introduced. The first, which
was an extension of the third hypothesis from the pilot study, was used to determine
whether the year-to-year changes in the financial weakness variables were related to OPEB
plan reductions. The second new hypothesis would test for a possible statistical
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relationship between interaction variables 5 through 8 and OPEB reductions noted among
sample firms.
As a consequence of these changes, the hypotheses used in this final study could
be stated as:
Hypothesis 1 is as follows:
1.

Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between any of the financial
weakness variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between at least one o f the
financial weakness variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.

Hypothesis 2 is as follows:
2.

Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between the level o f the
OPEB liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between the level of the
OPEB liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.

Hypothesis 3 is as follows:
3.

Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between the change in the
level o f the OPEB liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between the change in the
level of the OPEB liability and OPEB reductions among sample firms.

Hypothesis 4 is as follows:
4.

Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between the change in the
financial weakness variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between the change in the
financial weakness variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.

Hypothesis 5 is as follows:
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5.

Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between any of the first
four interaction variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between at least one of the
first four interaction variables and OPEB reductions among sample
firms.

Hypothesis 6 is as follows:
6.

Ho: There is no significant statistical relationship between any of the second
four interaction variables and OPEB reductions among sample firms.
Ha: There is a significant statistical relationship between at least one of the
second four interaction variables and OPEB reductions among sample
firms.

Means Tests
As was the case in the pilot study, the first step in using discriminant analysis was
to determine if the means of the two groups (change versus no-change) were significantly
different. If they were not, discriminant analysis could not accurately define whether a
given observation would fit into a particular group. Accordingly, MANOVA tests were
now employed for the two groups for each year. These means tests again showed that the
variables for which there were differences between group means had statistical significance
in the final models for each year. For 1995, however, means tests did not find any o f these
variables to be statistically different between these two groups, which suggests that
discriminant analysis would be useless for that year.

Results from the First Stage of Data Analysis
The first analysis performed used prior probabilities that were determined by the
sample used in the final study. First, the probability of a firm being represented in group
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0 (no change) was assumed to be .97 for all years except 1994, and the probability of a
firm being represented in group 1 (change) was assumed to be .03 for the same period.
For 1994, on the other hand, the probabilities were .98 and .02 for group 0 and group 1,
respectively. Justification for use of these prior probability figures was based upon the
proportion of change firms to total firms in the sample studied. For the second stage of the
analysis, the sample size was systematically reduced to 120 firms to bring the prior
probabilities into a less extreme range.

Summary of Results Using the
Full Sample
1994 Results. For 1994, the null hypothesis was rejected for hypothesis 5, since
both INTI93 and INT493 were significant at the .05 level. The null hypothesis was also
rejected for hypothesis 6, as INT594 was found to be significant at the .05 level. For all
other hypotheses, we could not reject the null hypothesis. Since the model was unable to
classify many of the firms correctly, these results appear not to be particularly meaningful.
Overall, the results for 1994 indicated that the predictive ability of the model was
very poor since only 574 of the 587 observations were classified correctly (see Table 7 and
Table 8). Nearly all of the misclassified firms were change firms that were placed into
group 0 (no-change). The classificatory accuracy of the model was 97.6 percent, but given
the fact that 98 percent of the firms in the sample were no-change firms, one could actually
do slightly better by positing that all the firms in the sample were no-change firms. Since
three variables were significant at the .05 level, it would be normal to expect the model to
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have reasonably good classificatory power. Since it did not, it is likely that the extreme
prior probabilities caused discriminant analysis to “force” observations into the dominant
group, which in this case is group 0.
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The results for 1994 suggested that some of the OPEB reduction decisions might
be related both to debt levels and to OPEB liability levels experienced in the prior year of
1993. However, since the model’s classificatory power was poor, this could not be
confirmed by the results obtained in the first analysis.
1995 R esults. As the results from the means tests indicated, the relationships
were weaker in 1995. None of the 6 hypotheses were rejected, since none of the variables
were significant at the .05 level. The discriminant analysis failed to classify correctly any
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of the change firms, but all the no-change firms were classified correctly. It appears that
there is no statistically significant relationship between any o f the independent variables
and OPEB reduction decisions during 1995. Again, the problems caused by extreme prior
probabilities probably make these results rather meaningless.
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As shown in Table 9 and Table 10, the data for 1995 show no evidence that any
of the OPEB reductions were related to any of the variables in the full model. For 1995,
the model again classified firms about as accurately as a random selection.

1996 Results. The TD/TA95 variable was statistically significant at the .05 level
and, accordingly, the null hypothesis was rejected for hypothesis 1. Again, however, since
the model did not have strong classificatory power, this may have little meaning.
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for hypothesis 2, but it was rejected for
hypothesis 3 since the change in OPEB liability did appear to have a statistically significant
relationship with OPEB reductions. Once again, this may be considered insignificant given
the weakness o f the model as a whole.
For hypothesis 4, the null hypothesis was rejected since the CTD/TA96 variable
was significant at the .05 level. Due to the model’s lack of classificatory power, the
significance of the variable loses its meaning.
The null hypothesis for hypothesis 5 was also rejected because both INT395 and
INT495 were significant at the .05 level. Again, due to the classificatory weakness of the
overall model, the rejection of the hypothesis loses its meaningfiilness.
Finally, the null hypothesis was not rejected for hypothesis 6 because none of the
second group of interaction variables were significant at the .05 level.
As a group, the ability of the model to predict was very weak since only 567 of the
588 observations were classified correctly (see Table 11 and Table 12). This gives a
classificatory accuracy of 96.4 percent, which is less precise than a postulation that all
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firms belonged in group 0. Moreover, most of the misclassified firms were change firms
that were erroneously placed into the no-change group. This provides further evidence that
discriminant analysis might have been reacting negatively to the extreme prior probabilities,
especially since several variables were statistically significant in 1996.
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In 1996, results once again suggested that some of the OPEB reduction decisions
were based upon both levels of and changes in several key variables, but since the model
lacked classificatory power, these relationships are unlikely to be meaningful.

1997 R esults. For 1997, the financial weakness variables were found to be
insignificant, so using .05 as the critical confidence level, it was impossible to reject the
null hypothesis for the first hypothesis.

There did not appear to be a significant

relationship between financial weakness variables and OPEB reduction decisions during
1997.
The null hypothesis could not be rejected for hypothesis 2 or hypothesis 3. With
hypothesis 4, however, the null hypothesis was rejected since the variable CTD/TA97 was
significant at the .05 level. Since the model lacked classificatory power once again, the
relevance of this statistical significance is lost. The null hypothesis was not rejected for
hypotheses 5 or 6.
Altogether, the classificatory accuracy of the model was quite weak with only 568
of 585 being classified correctly (see Table 13 and Table 14). Again, the model’s
classificatory power resembled that of a biased guess that all firms were no-change firms.
As was the case for the other years, most of the misclassified firms were change firms
misidentified as no-change firms, further strengthening the assertion that discriminant
analysis was losing much of its power to an extreme set of prior probabilities.
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The results for 1997 found only one variable to be of consequence. O f course, with
the poor performance o f the model, the variable’s significance is not particularly relevant
at this point.
The fact that nearly all the firms were being classified as no-change firms in each
year raised the question as to whether discriminant analysis was trying to “force”
observations into group 0, since almost all the observations in the full sample belong to
that group. For each year, the model classified nearly all the firms as no-change firms
(group 0), which would tend to support this assertion. If this were to change in the second
stage of analysis where the sample size was systematically reduced, it might provide
further evidence that the prior probabilities were causing discriminant analysis to
inappropriately classify change firms (group 1) as no-change firms (group 0). However, if
this were to occur with the reduced sample, it could suggest that either the prior
probabilities were still too extreme or that the classification errors were due mainly to the
variables’ poor classificatory power. If the results from the second analysis again showed
several variables to be significant while the model still misdassified nearly all the change
firms, it would suggest that the model’s classificatory limitations were most likely due to
the still rather extreme prior probabilities. Obviously, no direct comparison can be made
between an analysis o f the full sample with one of a reduced sample.

Results from the Second Stage of Data Analysis
The sample was reduced for the second analysis to determine whether the extreme
prior probabilities were causing the discriminant analysis to classify change firms
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incorrectly as no-change firms. Since the prior probabilities with the full sample were even
more extreme than those in the pilot study, the systematic reduction of the sample of no
change firms proposed in Chapter 3 was necessary. The total sample was reduced from
588 firms to 120, which changed the prior probabilities to .85 and . 15 for 1997 and 1996,
.84 and .16 for 1995, and .90 and .10 for 1994. These figures are similar to those proposed
in Chapter 3. The reduced sample was originally expected to contain between 450 and 500
firms, but since the total number of firms offering OPEBs during the period of study was
less than the proposed sample of 1,632 firms, the reduced sample had to be reduced to 120
to obtain the prior probabilities proposed in Chapter 3. The justification for this reduction
is that when prior probabilities are really extreme, discriminant analysis tends to lose some
of its ability to separate individual observations into groups. With the prior probabilities
in the full sample, one would be 97 percent to 98 percent accurate by guessing that all
firms in the sample were no-change firms. As can be seen by the results of the analysis of
the full sample, the model did not classify observations any more accurately than such a
postulation.
From the analysis of the full sample, the model’s classificatory power was very
weak in each year, despite some of the variables being statistically significant. The results
o f the second analysis showed that the classificatory power of the model again was very
weak. In addition, several variables were statistically significant at the .05 level.
Discriminant analysis still classified very few of the firms as members o f group 1, which
was consistent with the findings in the first stage of the analysis. It appears that the results
in the second stage of the analysis were confounded by the effects of extreme prior
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probabilities or a poor model. Although the prior probabilities were less extreme than
those in the first analysis, they still appear to be causing the same statistical problem.
Despite the statistical significance of several variables, the model’s classificatory power
again resembled that of a guess that all firms were no-change firms.

1994 R esults. The results for 1994 indicate that most of the firms were classified
as group 0 firms (no-change). In addition, 11 firms were misclassified, so the model’s
classificatory power of 90.8 percent is just slightly better than the 90.0 percent accuracy
of a guess (based on prior probabilities) that all firms would belong to group 0.
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1995 Results. The results for 1995 show that nearly all firms were classified as
group 0 (no-change) firms and that almost all the misclassified firms were group 1 firms
erroneously placed into group 0. The classificatory accuracy of 85 percent for 1995 was
approximately equal to that of a guess based on prior probabilities, just as it was for 1994.
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1996 Results. The model did not perform much better in 1996, as shown in
Table 19 and Table 20. The model misclassified 16 firms, most o f which were group 1
firms misidentified as belonging to group 0. This represents a classificatory accuracy of
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86.7 percent, which is slightly better than the 85.0 percent an educated speculation (based
on prior probabilities) would yield.
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1997 R e su lts. In 1997, the mode! misclassified 14 firms, with most being group
1 firms placed into group 0 by mistake. This was a slight improvement over the results in
the first analysis. The classificatory accuracy of 88.2 percent is a little better than the 84.9
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percent accuracy that would be achieved by simply assuming that all the firms were no
change firms, based on prior probabilities.
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These findings, just as those obtained using the full sample imply that there is no
statistically significant relationship between financial weakness and OPEB reductions, nor
is there one between the level of the OPEB liability and plan reductions. However, since
individual variables in the model were found to have a statistically significant relationship
with OPEB plan reductions, these results are questionable. Probably the most significant
discovery in the second analysis was the slight improvement in the overall classificatory
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accuracy of the model when compared to that of a knowledgeable postulation that all firms
belong to group 0. This is consistent with the slight decrease in the prior probabilities over
those present in the first analysis. Still, given the significance of several variables, logic
would dictate that there should be a larger gap between model’s accuracy and that of a
biased selection than existed in either the first or second analysis. If the prior probabilities
have been causing this inconsistency, a greater reduction in prior probabilities should
widen the gap between the accuracy of a guess and that of the model. At this point, further
analysis was deemed necessary. Accordingly, a third analysis was performed.

Results from the Third Stage of Data Analysis
In this third analysis, the entire group of change firms was taken and each change
firm was matched to one of the no-change firms of similar size, using total assets as the
proxy for size. By performing this analysis in such a manner, the prior probabilities were
reduced to exactly .50 and .50, meaning that any firm taken at random from the sample
had an equal chance of being from group 0 or group 1. So, by having prior probabilities
resembling those of a coin toss, the results should not be confounded by an unbalanced
data set. If the model still lacks classificatory power, it would help confirm what was found
in the first two analyses. Conversely, if the model has considerably better classificatory
ability than it did in the previous analyses, it would probably indicate that in both the full
and systematically reduced samples, the prior probabilities were too extreme and had
caused discriminant analysis to force observations into the dominant group.
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MANOVA tests were run for the two groups for each year. These means tests
again showed that the variables for which there were differences between group means had
statistical significance in the final models for each year.
Group means are shown for all variables in the model, including the lagged
variables. The means tests for 1994 were as follows:
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j M
VARIABLE
TD/TA94
NI/TA94
OI/TA94
OCF/TA94
AP/TA94
CTD/TA94
CNI/TA94
COI/TA94
CCF/TA94
CAP/TA94
INTI 94
INT294
INT394
INT494
INT594
INT694
INT794
INT894
1 LAGGED VARIABLES
TD/TA93
NI/TA93
OI/TA93
OCF/TA93
APBO/TA93
INT193
INT293
INT393*
INT493

B

i a —

i i i g

GROUP 0 (No-Chance)
0.2718475
0.0469300
0.0823800
0.0964900
0.0416200
-0.0216000
0.0303400
0.0232300
-0.0144000
0.0018500
0.0091490
1.0788860
0.5081432
0.7681257
0.0000761
0.1878021
-0.0777000
0.0052980
GROUP 0 (No-Chance)
0.2934923
0.0165900
0.0591400
0.1109234
0.0397700
0.0098330
0.4185559
1.0282240
0.5885269

GROUP 1 (Change)
0.3242922
-0.0063800
0.0410700
0.0634700
0.0766300
-0.0148000
0.0824600
0.0265798
-0.0111000
-0.1781697
0.0243500
2.1703890
1.9554040
1.2296800
0.0131000
-1.6241830
-5.5966960
-1.8711020
GROUP 1 (Chance)
0.3391601
-0.0888000
0.0144900
0.0746400
0.2548060
0.1284548
-1.5203980
-0.4533161
2.9597150

* Indicates a variable that was statistically significant in the model
Source: MANOVA Procedure
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For 1995, the group means were as follows:

HRSSuiiM

I—

GROUP 1 (Change!
GROUP 0 (No-Change!
VARIABLE
TD/TA95*
0.3299622
0.2094904
-0.0087800
NI/TA95*
0.0720500
0.0325100
0.1013514
OI/TA95
0.0764900
0.0979800
OCF/TA95
0.0584728
0.0435300
APBO/TA95
-0.0067600
-0.0126000
CTD/TA95
-0.0313000
-0.0006830
CNI/TA95
-0.0270000
-0.0069700
COI/TA95
0.0048900
-0.0051100
CCF/TA95
0.0141400
-0.0012000
CAP/TA95
0.0079740
0.0104582
INTI 95
0.6320230
0.9704812
INT295
1.2066320
0.3659950
INT395
-0.0773000
0.4004364
INT495
-0.0010700
-0.0000375
INT595
-1.9209480
INT695
0.2589340
-1.4458150
-0.6968790
INT795
0.0677000
-0.6387340
INT895
GROUP 1 (Change!
GROUP 0 (No-Change!
LAGGED VARIABLES
0.3242922
0.2718475
TD/TA94
-0.0063800
0.0469300
NI/TA94
0.0410700
0.0823800
OI/TA94
0.0634700
0.0964900
OCF/TA94
0.0766300
0.0416200
APBO/TA94
0.0243500
INT194
0.0091490
2.1703890
1.0788860
INT294
1.9554040
0.5081432
INT394
1.2296800
INT494
0.7681257
* Indicates a variable that was statistically significant in the model
Source: MANOVA Procedure
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For 1996, the group means were as follows:

[-

CROU PM E/

GROUP 1 (Change)
GROUP 0 (No-Change)
VARIABLE
0.4939735
0.2761801
TD/TA96
0.0097600
0.0599100
NI/TA96
0.0412800
0.0967700
OI/TA96
0.0683700
0.1000350
OCF/TA96
0.0406700
0.0243900
APBO/TA96
0.0297700
-0.0262000
CTD/TA96
-0.0071800
-0.0042100
CNI/TA96
0.0097530
-0.0096600
COI/TA96
0.0448900
0.0078610
CCF/TA96
-0.0057200
-0.0023300
CAP/TA96
0.0135400
0.0050280
INTI 96*
0.1255991
0.4443824
INT296
-0.2780344
0.1924495
INT396
0.7796025
0.5213550
INT496
0.0009684
0.0007463
INT596
0.0525300
-0.0404000
INT696
0.0678300
-0.1128174
INT796
0.0035100
0.1494852
INT896
GROUP 1 (Change)
GROUP 0 (No-Change)
LAGGED VARIABLES
0.3299622
0.2094904
TD/TA95
-0.0087800
0.0720500
NI/TA95
0.0325100
0.1013514
OI/TA95*
0.0764900
0.0979800
OCF/TA95
0.0584728
0.0435300
APBO/TA95
0.0104582
0.0079740
INT195
0.9704812
0.6320230
INT295
1.2066320
0.3659950
INT395
-0.0773000
0.4004364
INT495
* Indicates a variable that was statistically significant in the model
Source: MANOVA Procedure
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For 1997, the group means were as follows:

—

ia!
1 18— —
GROUP 1(Chanee)

VARIABLE
GROUP 0 INo-Chanse)
0.2616107
0.2761801
TD/TA97
0.0586300
0.0599100
NI/TA97
0.0704900
0.0967700
OI/TA97
0.0726400
0.1000350
OCF/TA97
0.0551900
0.0243900
APBO/TA97
-0.0783000
0.0062310
CTD/TA97*
0.0332200
-0.0212000
CNI/TA97
0.0102800
-0.0190000
COI/TA97
-0.0137000
-0.0242233
CCF/TA97
-0.0197000
-0.0022500
CAP/TA97
0.0123500
0.0096440
INT197
2.1231280
-1.0681010
INT297
0.3028621
0.3582375
INT397
0.7806534
-0.3392735
INT497
0.0045700
-0.0000839
INT597*
0.3747548
-1.0960050
INT697
0.0546900
0.5048344
INT797
0.1767520
-0.0302000
INT897
GROUP 1 (Chancel
GROUP 0 INo-Chanse)
LAGGED VARIABLES
0.2742061
0.4939735
TD/TA96
0.0097600
0.0529400
NI/TA96
0.0412800
0.0885100
OI/TA96
0.0683700
0.1079660
OCF/TA96
0.0406700
0.0832400
APBO/TA96*
0.0135400
0.0050280
INT196
0.1255991
0.4443824
INT296
-0.2780344
0.1924495
INT396
0.7796025
0.5213550
INT496
* Indicates a variable that was statistically significant in the model
Source: MANOVA Procedure

1994 Results. For 1994, the results were stronger than they were in the first two
analyses. Five firms were misclassified (as shown in Table 29), so the model has a
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classificatory accuracy of 79.17 percent. This is considerably better than the accuracy of
a guess, which in this case, would be exactly 50 percent. These results provide evidence
that some of the model’s previous inability to classify firms in the first two analyses was
due to extreme prior probabilities. In the third analysis, as in the first two, several variables
were significant. This is consistent with the model possessing a significantly better
classificatory accuracy than a mere guess.
The financial weakness variables were found not to be statistically significant at the
.05 level, so we fail to reject the null hypothesis for hypothesis 1. There appears not to be
a statistical relationship between the financial weakness variables and OPEB reduction
decisions in 1994.
For hypothesis 2, we also fail to reject the null hypothesis, since the OPEB
liability does not appear to have a statistically significant relationship with OPEB reduction
decisions.
The null hypothesis for hypothesis 3 is not rejected, since the change in the OPEB
liability appears not to have a statistically significant relationship with OPEB reduction
decisions.
The null hypothesis for hypothesis 4 is not rejected since the change in the financial
weakness variables does not appear to have a statistically significant relationship with
OPEB reduction decisions.
However, the null hypothesis for hypothesis 5 is rejected, since the variable INT3
is significant at the .05 level. The significance o f INT3 provides evidence that the
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interaction between the level of cash flows in 1994 and the level of the OPEB liability (in
the same year) may have influenced decisions to reduce OPEB plans in 1994.
The null hypothesis is not rejected in the case of hypothesis 6, since none of the
second group of interaction variables is significant at the .05 level.

HI
H2
H3
H4
H5
H6

Ho Rejected?
Yes
No
X
X
X
X
X
X
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PREDICTED
0
1
0

11

1

12

1

4

8

12

15

9

24

ACTUAL

*

Row

Act

Pred

P(0)

P(l)

2

1

0

0.687

0.313

3

1

0

0.776

0.224

00

1

0

0.850

0.150

14

1

0

0.711

0.289

17

0

1

0.427

0.573

1995 Results. For 1995, the null hypothesis for hypothesis 1is rejected, as there
appears to be a statistical relationship between at least one of the financial weakness
variables and OPEB reduction decisions. Specifically, NI/TA95 and TD/TA95 were
statistically significant at the .05 level. The significance of NI/TA95 indicates that the level
of net income in 1995 had some influence on OPEB reduction decisions made during that
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year. Since TD/TA95 was also significant, the debt level in 1995 appears to have had some
influence on OPEB reduction decisions during the year.
For hypothesis 2, the null hypothesis is not rejected, since the OPEB liability
appears not to have a statistically significant relationship with OPEB reduction decisions.
The null hypothesis is not rejected for hypothesis 3, since the change in the OPEB
liability appears not to have a statistically significant relationship with OPEB reduction
decisions.
The null hypothesis for hypothesis 4 is not rejected since the change in the financial
weakness variables does not appear to have a statistically significant relationship with
OPEB reduction decisions.
The null hypothesis for hypothesis 5 is also not rejected, since none of the first
group of interaction variables are significant at the .05 level.
The null hypothesis is not rejected in the case of hypothesis 6, since none of the
second group of interaction variables are significant at the .05 level
For 1995, the model’s classificatory accuracy was 75.0 percent, which is fairly
good. There were eleven misclassified firms (see Table 32), but in contrast to the results
obtained in the first two analyses, not all the misclassified firms were change firms
misidentified as no-change firms.
Overall, the classificatory power of the model was slightly weaker for 1995.
Although there were no variables found to be significant for 1995 in the first two analyses,
two variables were significant in the third analysis.
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TH URB STAGE OF
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Ho Rejected?
Yes
No
X
HI
X
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X
H3
X
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X
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X
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G £ OF
Row

Act

Pred

P(0)

P(l)

1

1

0

0.534

0.466

9

1

0

0.545

0.455

12

1

0

0.692

0.308

18

0

1

0.374

0.626

24

0

1

0.471

0.529

27

1

0

0.742

0.258

29

1

0

0.655

0.345

32

1

0

0.700

0.300

33

1

0

0.613

0.387

35

0

1

0.407

0.593

38

0

1

0.464

0.536

1996 R esu lts. For 1996, the null hypothesis for hypothesis 1 is rejected, as there
appears to be a statistical relationship between at least one of the financial weakness
variables and OPEB reduction decisions. Specifically, OI/TA95 was statistically significant
at the .05 level, which suggests that the level of operating income in 1995 had some
influence on OPEB reduction decisions made in 1996.
For hypothesis 2, the null hypothesis is not rejected, since the OPEB liability
appears not to have a statistically significant relationship with OPEB reduction decisions.
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The null hypothesis is not rejected for hypothesis 3, since the change in the OPEB
liability appears not to have a statistically significant relationship with OPEB reduction
decisions.
The null hypothesis for hypothesis 4 is not rejected since the change in the financial
weakness variables does not appear to have a statistically significant relationship with
OPEB reduction decisions.
The null hypothesis for hypothesis 5 was rejected since at least one of the first four
interaction variables is significant at the .05 level. The significance of INTI 96 indicates
that the interaction between the level of total debt to assets and the level of the OPEB
liability had an influence on the decisions to reduce OPEB plans during the year.
The null hypothesis is not rejected in the case of hypothesis 6, since none of the
second group of interaction variables is significant at the .05 level
Overall, the results for 1996 were slightly stronger. The model’s classificatory
accuracy was 77.78 percent. There were eight misclassified firms (see Table 35).

Ho Rejected?
HI
H2
H3
H4
H5
H6
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X

No
X
X
X

X
X

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

95

■B I K U S I A M

H j||jj)I B

m

PREDICTED
1
0
0

15

3

18

1

5

13

18

ACTUAL

16

20

36

lit

«ss
Row

Act

Pred

P(0)

P(l)

3

1

0

0.829

0.171

4

0

1
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9

1
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1

0

0.581
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1

0

0.581

0.419

16

0

1

0.495

0.505

30

0

1

0.215

0.785

31

1

0

0.901

0.099

1997 R esults. For 1997, the null hypothesis for hypothesis 1 is not rejected since
none of the financial weakness variables were statistically significant at the .05 level. There
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appears not to be a statistical relationship between the financial weakness variables and
OPEB reduction decisions.
For hypothesis 2, the null hypothesis is not rejected, since the OPEB liability
appears to have a statistically significant relationship with OPEB reduction decisions.
The significance of the APBO/TA96 variable indicates that the level of the OPEB
liability as a percentage of total assets during 1996 appears to have had an influence on
OPEB plan reduction decisions in 1997.
The null hypothesis is not rejected for hypothesis 3, since the change in the OPEB
liability appears not to have a statistically significant relationship with OPEB reduction
decisions.
The null hypothesis for hypothesis 4 is rejected since the change in at least one of
the financial weakness variables appears to have a statistically significant relationship with
OPEB reduction decisions. Since the CTD/TA97 variable was significant, there is evidence
that the change in the total debt level between 1996 and 1997 may have influenced OPEB
reduction decisions made in 1997.
The null hypothesis for hypothesis S is also not rejected, since none o f the first
group of interaction variables is significant at the .05 level.
The null hypothesis is rejected for hypothesis 6, since at least one of the second
group of interaction variables is significant at the .05 level. The statistical significance of
INT597 suggests that the interaction between the change in total debt between 1996 and
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1997 and the change in the OPEB liability during the same period influenced OPEB plan
reductions during 1997.
Overall, the results for 1997 were similar to those in 1996 except for the fact that
different variables were significant. The model’s classificatory accuracy again was 77.7S
percent, which is fairly good. There were eight misclassified firms (see Table 38).
Interestingly, the model classified more firms as change firms than no-change firms. This
is in stark contrast with the results in the first two analyses. This provides further evidence
that the extreme prior probabilities that existed with the first two stages o f the analysis
caused discriminant analysis to classify too many firms as no-change firms, based upon the
unbalanced nature o f the sample in both cases.
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Summary of Results from the Third
Stage of Data Analysis
The overall findings in the third analysis were inconsistent with the first two steps
in the data analysis. The discriminant analysis classified many more firms into the change
group than it did in the first two analyses. This appears to indicate that the extreme prior
probabilities in the first two stages of analysis rendered the model useless. In the third
analysis, the model was found to have considerably better classificatory power. The results
o f this third analysis are much more reliable than those in the first two, so the conclusions
in this study will be made based upon the findings in the third stage of analysis.
Based upon the results obtained in the third analysis, there appears to be a
significant relationship between some of the financial weakness variables and OPEB plan
reductions. Therefore, it appears that some of the OPEB plan reduction decisions during
the 1994*97 period were influenced to some extent either by the level of some of these key
variables or the changes in the levels of the variables from one year to the next. Also, it
appears that there is a relationship between the level of the OPEB liability and plan
reductions. This also provides evidence that there is at least a slight long-term effect
associated with SFAS No. 106. One of the major concerns surrounding the passage of this
statement was that disclosure of this liability might increase the likelihood that companies
would reduce or terminate OPEB plans. Although evidence suggests strongly that this
occurred with the adoption of SFAS No. 106, the statistical analysis in this study indicates
that it has not been a particularly significant factor to date in the post-adoption period.
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However, the OPEB liability was most significant in 1997, the most recent year available.
Future research should be able to determine whether this is the beginning of a pattern.
Another finding that was consistent in the three steps of data analysis was the lack
o f a clearly defined trend over the period examined. However, some year-to-year
differences were found. The most interesting of these differences was the increased
importance of the OPEB liability variables in 1997. Since no data after 1997 were
available, it is uncertain whether this represents the beginning of a pattern. The justification
for analyzing firms in separate years was that such separation was necessary to determine
whether significant year-to-year differences existed or if a trend was evident. The existence
of a trend or significant year-to-year differences would have a negative effect on the
classificatory power of the model if all the changes were examined without regard to year.
One last analysis was performed to test for this.

Results from the Fourth Stage of Data Analysis
In the fourth and final analysis, all the change firms were combined without regard
to year and matched to the no-change firms identified in the third analysis. This yielded a
sample of 131, of which 64 were change firms and 67 were no-change firms. For one firm,
data were not available for one year. The analysis showed that two firms changed benefits
in both 1994 and 1996. These facts explain the existence of only 64 change firms
compared with 67 no-change firms. This brought the prior probabilities to .51 and .49 for
groups 0 and 1, respectively. The results appear in Table 39.
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The results showed that the model had somewhat weaker classificatory power than
that found in the third analysis. Although 54 firms were identified as change firms, a total
of 40 firms (consisting of both change and no-change firms) were misclassified. This
indicates that the model’s classificatory power is slightly less accurate when the year o f
change is not considered. Since 91 of the 131 firms were classified correctly, the model’s
classificatory power was 69.5 percent, compared with 75.0 to 79.2 percent in the third
analysis. Since the differences in classificatory accuracy were quite small, the results
indicate that taking the different years into account failed to improve the model’s
classificatory power significantly. The specific differences between years were not readily
discemable, so it can be concluded that stratification by year, at least for the period
covered in this study, was not necessary.
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Summary of Results
Here, aggregate findings suggested that there is a connection between OPEB
liability levels and at least some of the OPEB reductions during the 1994-97 period.
Statistical analysis appears to show a relationship between several of the financial
weakness variables and some of the OPEB reductions experienced during this time.
These results, however, provide only limited evidence for a relationship between
financial weakness and OPEB reductions. Such observations also provide only limited
evidence for any connection between the levels of OPEB liability and subsequent OPEB
reductions. Clearly the evidence is too weak to allow highly accurate classification of firms
as either change or no-change firms using the variables examined in this study. However,
since the model’s classificatory accuracy was better than chance, there appears to be some
evidence linking financial weakness and the OPEB liability to some of the decisions to
reduce postretirement benefits in the post-SFAS No. 106 adoption period. The results of
this investigation also are somewhat inconsistent with those of prior studies of OPEB
reductions and of those concerning pension plan reductions. These other inquiries, as
found in Table 40, suggest that there was a significant connection between financial
weakness and OPEB reductions as well as with pension plan reductions. For example,
Mittelstaedt et al. (199S) determined that there was a statistically significant relationship
between financial weakness and OPEB reduction decisions. In addition, Mittelstaedt
(1989), Thomas (1989), and Stone (1987), all found financial weakness to be a key
variable in explaining pension plan reductions. However, in this study these relationships

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

103
were considerably weaker. The current research appears to be the first to examine OPEB
reductions since the adoption of SFAS No. 106 and, therefore, no direct comparison
between this investigation and others can be made.
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Mittelstaedt (1989) and Thomas
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In any case, results of this study show what would be logically expected. After all,
there has been a tremendous reduction in the number of firms continuing to offer post
retirement benefits since the adoption of SFAS No. 106. In fact, Mittelstaedt et al. (1995)
found that many of them dropped OPEB coverage once this standard was adopted. It
certainly would appear, therefore, that this circumstance "weeded out" many of the weaker
firms, an assertion quite consistent with this study’s findings. In fact, if the majority o f the
weak firms had already stopped their OPEB coverage, it follows that by the end of 1993,
relatively few o f those weak firms were now still offering postretirement benefits.
This finding alone could help in explaining the small number of firms still offering
such coverage. Furthermore, the tiny number of such weak firms might have had an effect
on the explanatory power of the financial weakness variables used in this investigation.
Also, the unusually strong economy during the period examined by this study could have
contributed to the relative insignificance of the financial weakness variables. It does seem
likely that, out of the sample of firms investigated, there were fewer financially weak
companies than might have been present under weaker economic conditions. Inasmuch
as the adoption of SFAS No. 106 demanded a major change in the accounting o f
postretirement benefits, it certainly is possible that the fundamental connection between
these benefits and predictors of plan reductions could have changed. Many of the weak
firms in the Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) study were not included in this study, since they had
terminated OPEB benefits prior to 1994. This might help explain why financial weakness
had a poorer predictive ability in this study than that found by Mittelstaedt et al. (1995).
It is also possible that during the period Mittelstaedt et al. examined there was an
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interaction between financial weakness and the adoption of SFAS No. 106, which
represents a relationship that does not exist in the post-adoption period. However, because
systematic analysis revealed no other SFAS No. 106 studies in the post-adoption period
that examined OPEB reductions, one cannot affirm these conclusions with other
independent studies.
The relative weakness of the explanatory power of OPEB liability is not especially
surprising since, as previously mentioned, the adoption of SFAS No. 106 greatly reduced
the number of firms offering OPEBs. One of the concerns surrounding SFAS No. 106 was
the possibility o f a long-term effect. One of the questions concerned whether having to
record OPEB liability might have led to increased OPEB reductions. It is quite possible,
o f course, that the results o f this study indicate, simply, that the level o f this liability has
a small negative long-term effect on OPEB coverage. In other words, the level o f the
liability may be associated with a slightly increased likelihood o f OPEB plan reductions.
However, the period 1994-1997 represented the very first period occurring after the
adoption o f SFAS No. 106. In view of this, it would be premature to conclude that there
is a long-term effect from use of this new accounting standard. Accordingly, further study
will be necessary before such an assertion can be validated.

Limitations of the Final Study
One of the constraints of the pilot study was its small sample size. By using the
entire group o f firms offering postretirement benefits during the 1994-1997 period in the
final study, that problem was addressed. However, due to the extremely small proportion
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o f change firms to no-change firms in the sample, the prior probabilities were so extreme
that the results from the first two stages of the analysis were invalidated. As a result, the
sample had to be reduced to the point where there was a one-to-one ratio o f change to no
change firms. Therefore, the conclusions in this study were based on the results obtained
with a smaller sample than anticipated. Another limitation was the time period being used.
Other methodologies, such as that used by Mittelstaedt et al. (1995) could not be used
here, since they lagged some of the financial weakness variables three years. Nevertheless,
as an experiment, the variables were lagged for three years for 1996 and 1997 in this study
but they were found not to be statistically significant. Of course, fundamental relationships
could have changed since the adoption of SFAS No. 106.
It seems apparent, however, that the small number of firms offering OPEB benefits
in comparison with the total number is significant by itself. This supports the assumption
that adoption of SFAS No. 106 did have an effect on subsequent decisions to reduce or
eliminate postretirement benefits.

Conclusions Based Upon Results of Final Study
There does appear to be a relationship between financial weakness and levels of
OPEB liability and the subsequent reduction o f postretirement benefits. At this juncture,
connections found in this inquiry were too weak to be of great classificatory value, but the
results obtained do suggest the need for further research. It is, of course, quite possible
that the relationship between financial weakness and OPEB reductions changed from what
they were prior to as well as during the adoption of SFAS No. 106. Nevertheless, the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

107
findings presented here are clearly at variance with those developed by prior investigations.
In this regard, it is significantly relevant to point out that prior research occurred during
either the pre-adoption or the adoption period of SFAS No. 106. Since the adoption of
that standard produced such a radical change in the accounting of postretirement benefits,
it would not be unreasonable to suggest that the fundamental relationship between OPEB
reductions and key variables might have changed. In any case, it is clear that further study
is needed.

Recommendations for Future Research
This study has revealed several issues which appear appropriate for further inquiry.
Several have already become apparent. Ultimately, the somewhat inconclusive results
offered here imply that other methodologies ought to be explored.

Some further

possibilities have become evident as a result. For example, does a relationship really exist
between the adoption date, the adoption method, and the benefit cuts which subsequently
occurred? Smith, in 1994, did find that the early adoption of SFAS No. 106 was
associated with financial weakness. It is possible, therefore, that later adoption, i.e.,
adoption in the fiscal year following December 15,1992, could be used as a proxy for preSFAS No. 106 financial weakness.
The results of the current study certainly have provided evidence that post-SFAS
No. 106 adoption financial weakness and the OPEB liability level may not be as strong
predictors of OPEB reductions as they were prior to the adoption of the accounting
standard.
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It is possible that the widely varying health care cost rate increases have led to
diminished OPEB liability predictive power. Although SFAS No. 106 does require firms
to predict rates at which they feel health care costs will increase, they give no specific
parameters within which such estimates must fall. Understandably, then, there is a wide
variation in the assumptions about cost increases by these firms. Furthermore, since OPEB
liability recorded on the company's balance sheets is predicated upon health care cost
assumptions, such potential liabilities could be significantly under- or over-stated. Thus,
if all the OPEB liability figures now are recalculated for each firm using one standard rate,
e.g., 6 percent, the OPEB liability figures might be considerably better predictors ofbenefit
plan reductions. Finally, if, after recalculating such figures, the variable still fails to predict
benefit cuts accurately, the suggestion that there is no long-term effect o f SFAS No. 106
would be reinforced considerably. Since SFAS No. 106 requires firms to disclose how
much a one percentage point would increase or decrease the health care cost o f OPEB
liability, such recalculations can be made.
Another option might be to conduct surveys to determine why firms that reduced
OPEB plans did so in the first place. With so few firms actually making reduction
decisions, however, the response rate would have to be unusually high in order to obtain
truly meaningful results.

Final Comments
One o f the major contributions provided by this study is the development of the
groundwork for the future study of postretirement benefits in the post-SFAS No. 106
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adoption era. Furthermore, this inquiry seems to represent the first attempt to have been
made to both identify and examine the relationship between the OPEB liability and
postretirement benefit cuts. Additionally, it would appear to be the first one to investigate
the relationship between financial weakness and postretirement benefit cuts experienced
in this same post-SFAS No. 106 adoption period.

Sample of Firms
AAR CORP*
ABBOTT LABORATORIES
ACME METALS INC
AFLAC INC
AGWAY INC
AH MANSON H F & CO
AIR & WATER TECHNOLOGIES
CORP*
AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS INC
AIRBORNE FREIGHT CORP
AIRTOUCH COMMUNICATIONS
INC
ALASKA AIR GROUP INC
ALBANY INTERNATIONAL CORP
ALBERTSONS INC
ALEXANDER & BALDWIN INC
ALEXANDERS INC*
ALLEGHANY CORP
ALLERGAN INC
ALLIED PRODUCTS CORP
ALLIED SIGNAL INC
ALLTEL CORP
AMAX GOLD INC

AMC ENTERTAINMENT INC
AMCAST INDUSTRIAL CORP
AMERCO
AMERICAN AIRLINES INC
AMERICAN BUSINESS
PRODUCTS INC*
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO
AMERICAN GENERAL CORP
AMERICAN GREETINGS CORP
AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS
CORP
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL
GROUP INC*
AMERICAN STANDARD INC
AMERICAN STORES CO
AMERITECH CORP
AMERON INTERNATIONAL
CORP
AMOCO CORP
AMP INC
AMPCO PITTSBURGH CORP*
AMR CORP
ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORP
ANR PIPELINE CO
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AON CORP
APPLIED POWER INC

BEMIS CO INC
BERLITZ INTERNATIONAL INC

AQUARION CO
ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO
ARCO CHEMICAL CO
ARISTAR INC*

BETHLEHEM STEEL CORP
BLACK & DECKER CORP
BLOCK DRUG CO INC
BLOUNT INC

ARKANSAS BEST CORP
ARMCOINC
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES
INC
ARVIN INDUSTRIES INC

BMC INDUSTRIES INC
BOISE CASCADE CORP
BORDEN INC
BOWATER INC

ASARCOINC
ASHLAND OIL INC
ASSOCIATES CORPORATION OF
NORTH AMERICA
ASTEC INDUSTRIES INC
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO
ATMOS ENERGY CO
AVATAR HOLDINGS INC
AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES INC
AVERY DENNISON CORP
AVON PRODUCTS INC
BAKER HUGHES INC
BALDWIN TECHNOLOGY CO INC
BALL CORP
BANDAG INC
BARD C R INC
BARNES GROUP INC
BATTLE MOUNTAIN GOLD CO
BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC
BECKMAN INSTRUMENTS INC
BECTON DICKINSON & CO
BELL ATLANTIC CORP
BELLSOUTH CORP

BRADY W H INC
BRIGGS & STRATTON CORP
BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB CO
BROWN FORMAN CORP
BROWN GROUP INC
BRUNSWICK CORP
BRUSH WELLMAN INC
BULOVA CORP*
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS
INC
BURLINGTON NORTHERN
RAILROAD CO
CABOT CORP
CABOT OIL & GAS CORP*
CADMUS COMMUNICATIONS
CORP
CALMAT CO
CAMBREX CORP
CAMPBELL SOUP CO
CAROLINA TELEPHONE &
TELEGRAPH CO
CARPENTER TECHNOLOGY
CORP
CARTER WALLACE INC
CASCADE CORP
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CASTLE A & M CO
CATERPILLAR INC
CENTRAL NEWSPAPERS INC
CENTURY TELEPHONE
ENTERPRISES INC
CERIDIAN CORP
CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL
CORP
CHATTEM INC
CHESAPEAKE CORP*
CHEVRON CORP
CHITTENDEN CORP
CHRYSLER CORP
CHUBB CORP
CHURCH & DWIGHT CO INC
CIGNA CORP
CILCORP INC
CINCINNATI BELL INC
CINCINNATI MILACRON INC
CINERGY CORP
CIT GROUP INC
CITICORP
CLARCORINC
CLARK REFINING & MARKETING
INC
CLEVELAND CLIFFS INC
CLOROX CO
CAN FINANCIAL CORP
COASTAL CORP
COCA COLA CO
COLGATE POLMOLIVE CO

CONE MILLS CORP
CONESTOGA ENTERPRISES INC
CONSECO INC*
CONSOLIDATED PAPERS INC
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORP
CONSOLIDATED TOMOKA
LAND CO
COOPER INDUSTRIES INC
COOPER TIRE & RUBBER CO
ADOLPH COORS CO*
CORE STATES FINANCIAL CORP
CORNING INC
CRANE CO
CROMPTON & KNOWLES CORP
CROWN CENTRAL PETROLEUM
CORP
CROWN CORK & SEAL CO INC
CTS CORP
CURTICE BURNS FOODS INC
CURTISS WRIGHT CORP*
CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS CO
DANA CORP
DATA GENERAL CORP
DEAN FOODS CO*
DEERE & CO
DELTA AIR LINES INC
DELUXE CORP
DETREX CORP
DIAL CORP
DIEBOLD INC
DOLE FOOD COMPANY INC

COLTEC INDUSTRIES INC
COMMERCIAL INTERTECH CORP

DOMINION RESOURCES INC

COMSAT CORP*
CONAGRA INC

DONNELLY CORP

R R DONNELLEY & SONS CO
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DOW CHEMICAL CO*
DOW JONES & CO INC
DPLINC
DRAVO CORP
DRESSER INDUSTRIES INC*
DUN & BRADSTREET CORP*
DUPONT E I D E NEMOURS & CO
EASTMAN KODAK CO
EATON CORP
ECOLAB INC
EDISON BROTHERS STORES INC
EDO CORP*
EC&GINC
EMC INSURANCE GROUP INC
ENGELHARD CORP
ENSERCH CORP
ENVTRODYNE INDUSTRIES INC
EQUIFAX INC
EQUITABLE RESOURCES INC*

FLUOR CORP
FMC CORP*
FOODARAMA SUPERMARKETS
INC
FORD MOTOR CO
FOREST OIL CORP
FOSTER WHEELER CORP
FREEPORT MCMORAN COPPER
& GOLD INC
FRONTIER CORP*
H B FULLER CO
ARTHUR GALLAGHER & CO
GANNETT CO INC
GATX CORP
GEHLCO
GENCORP INC
GENERAL AMERICAN TRANS
PORTATION CORP
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP

FAIRCHILD CORP

GENERAL ELECTRIC CO
GENERAL MILLS INC
GENERAL SIGNAL CORP
GENESCO INC
GENICOM CORP
GENRAD INC

FARMER BROTHERS CO
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP

GEORGIA PACIFIC CORP
GIBSON GREETINGS INC

FEDERAL MOGUL CORP
FEDERAL SIGNAL CORP
FERRO CORP
FIN A INC
FINOVA GROUP INC
FIRST BRANDS CORP

GILLETTE CO
GLATFELTER P H CO
GLEASON CORP
GLOBAL MARINE INC

ETHYL CORP
ETOWN CORP
EXCEL INDUSTRIES INC
EXIDE CORP

FLEMING COMPANIES INC
FLORIDA ROCK INDUSTRIES INC

GOLD KIST INC
GOODRICH B F CO
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO
GORMAN RUPP CO
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GRACOINC
GRAINGER W W INC
GRAND UNION CO
GRAYBAR ELECTRIC CO INC
GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA
CO INC
GTE COR?
HALLIBURTON CO
HANCOCK FABRICS INC
HANDY & HARMAN
HANNA M A CO
HANNAFORD BROTHERS CO
HARCOURT GENERAL INC
HARLAND JOHN H CO
HARLEY DAVIDSON INC

INGERSOLL RAND CO
INLAND STEEL CO
INTERLAKE CORP*
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
MACHINES CORP
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS &
FRAGRANCES INC
INTERNATIONAL MULTIFOODS
CORP*
INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO
INTERPUBLIC GROUP OF
COMPANIES INC
INTERSTATE BAKERIES CORP
JEFFERSON PILOT CORP
JEFFERSON SMURFIT CORP
JOHNSON & JOHNSON

HARSCO CORP*
HASBRO INC
HECLA MINING CO
HEINZ H J CO*

JOSTENS INC
JOURNAL COMMUNICATIONS

HELLER FINANCIAL INC
HERCULES INC

K & F INDUSTRIES INC
KAISER ALUMINUM &
CHEMICAL CORP*

HERTZ CORP
HEXCEL CORP
HON INDUSTRIES INC
HONEYWELL INC
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO*
HOUSTON INDUSTRIES INC
HUBBELL INC
HUFFY CORP

JPS TEXTILE GROUP INC
KN ENERGY INC

KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN
INDUSTRIES INC
KATY INDUSTRIES INC
KAYDON CORP
KELLOGG CO
KENNAMETAL INC*
KERR MCGEE CORP

ICF KAISER INTERNATIONAL INC
IDEX CORP
IES INDUSTRIES
ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC

KIMBERLY CLARK CORP
KIRBY CORP

IMO INDUSTRIES INC*

KROGER CO

KNIGHT RIDDER INC
KOLLMORGEN CORP

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

114
LADD FURNITURE INC*
LAFARGE CORP
LANCASTER COLONY CORP
LANCE INC
LEE SARA CORP
LEHMAN BROTHERS INC
LEUCADIA NATIONAL CORP*
LILLY ELI & CO
LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP
LITTON INDUSTRIES INC
LOEWS CORP
LONE STAR INDUSTRIES INC*
LONE STAR TECHNOLOGIES INC
LONGVIEW FIBRE CO
LUBRIZOL CORP
LYONDELL PETROCHEMICAL CO
MALLINCKRODT INC
MANITOWOC CO INC
MARK IV INDUSTRIES INC
MARSH & MC LENNAN
COMPANIES INC
MARSH SUPERMARKETS INC
MASCO CORP
MATTEL INC
MAUI LAND & PINEAPPLE CO INC*
MAXXAM GROUP INC*
MAY DEPARTMENT STORES CO
MC CORMICK & CO INC*
MC DERMOTT INC*
MC GRAW HILL COMPANIES INC
MDU RESOURCES GROUP INC
MEAD CORP
MEDIA GENERAL INC
MERCK & CO INC

MEREDITH CORP
MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC
MEYER FRED INC
MILLER HERMAN INC*
MILLIPORE CORP
MINNESOTA MINING &
MANUFACTURING CO
MITCHELL ENERGY &
DEVELOPMENT CORP
MOBIL CORP
MOLEX INC
MONSANTO CO
MONTGOMERY WARD
HOLDING CORP*
MOOG INC
MOORE BENJAMIN & CO
JP MORGAN & CO INC
MORRISON KNUDSON CORP
MUELLER INDUSTRIES INC
MURPHY OIL CORP
NACCO INDUSTRIES INC*
NALCO CHEMICAL CO
NASH FINCH CO
NASHUA CORP*
NATIONAL GAS & OIL CO
NATIONAL STANDARD CO
NATIONAL STEEL CORP
NAVISTAR FINANCIAL CORP
NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE CO
NCH CORP
NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP INC
NEW ENGLAND BUSINESS
SERVICE INC
NEW JERSEY RESOURCES CORP
NEW YORK TIMES CO

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

115
NEWELL CO
NEWMONT GOLD CO
NICOR INC
NIPSCO INDUSTRIES INC
NL INDUSTRIES INC
NOBLE AFFILIATES INC
NOLAND CO
NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORP
NORTHUP GRUMMAN CORP
NORTHWESTERN STEEL & WIRE
CO
NUICORP
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP
OGDEN CORP
OGLEB AY NORTON CO
OHIO BELL TELEPHONE CO
OLIN CORP
ONEIDA LTD
ONEOK INC

PACIFICORP
PARK OHIO INDUSTRIES INC
PARKER HANNIFIN CORP
PAYLESS CASHWAYS INC*
PENN VIRGINIA CORP
PENNSYLVANIA ENTERPRISES
INC
PENNZOIL CO
PENT AIR INC
PEPSICO INC
PERKIN ELMER CORP
PFIZER INC*
PHELPS DODGE CORP
PHHCORP
PHILIP MORRIS COMPANIES INC

ORANGE & ROCKLANDS
UTILITIES INC
OREGON STEEL MILLS INC

PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO
PINNACLE WEST CAPITAL CORP
PIONEER HI BRED INTER
NATIONAL INC
PITNEY BOWES INC*
PITTSTONCO
POGO PRODUCING INC

ORION CAPITAL CORP
ORYX ENERGY CO

POTLATCH CORP
PPG INDUSTRIES INC

OSHKOSH B'GOSH INC
OSHKOSH TRUCK CORP

PRECISION CASTPARTS CORP
PREMARK INTERNATIONAL INC

O' SULLIVAN CORP
OUTBOARD MARINE CORP*

PROCTER & GAMBLE CO
PUBLIX SUPERMARKETS INC

OWENS & MINOR INC*

PUERTO RICAN CEMENT CO INC

OWENS ILLINOIS INC
PACCAR INC
PACIFIC BELL
PACIFIC ENTERPRISES INC
PACIFIC LUMBER CO

PULITZER PUBLISHING CO
QUAKER CHEMICAL CORP
QUAKER OATS CO
QUAKER STATE CORP
QUANEX CORP

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

116
QUESTAR CORP
RALPH'S GROCERY CO
RALSTON PURINA CO
RAYCHEM CORP*
RAYONIER INC
READERS DIGEST ASSOCIATION
INC
REYNOLDS & REYNOLDS CO
REYNOLDS METALS CO
RIGGS NATIONAL CORP
RJR NABISCO INC
RMI TITANIUM CO
ROANOKE ELECTRIC STEEL CORP
ROBERTSON CECO CORP*
ROCHESTER & PITTSBURGH COAL
CO
ROGERS CORP
ROHM & HAAS CO
ROSES HOLDINGS INC*
ROUSE CO
ROWAN COMPANIES INC
RPM INC*
RUBBERMAID INC
RYDER SYSTEM INC
SAFECO CORP
SAFEWAY INC*
SALOMON SMITH BARNEY
HOLDINGS INC
SAVANNAH FOODS & INDUSTRIES
INC
SCANACORP
SCHERER RP CORP
SCHERING PLOUGH CORP
SCHULMAN A INC

SEARS ROEBUCK & CO*
SEQUACORP
SHELL OIL CO
SHERWIN WILLIAMS CO
SIGMA ALDRICH CORP
SILGAN HOLDINGS INC
SJW CORP
SMITH AO CORP*
SMITH CORONA CORP*
SMITH INTERNATIONAL INC
SMUCKER JM CO
SNAP ON INC
SONAT INC
SONOCO PRODUCTS CO
SOUTH JERSEY INDUSTRIES INC
SOUTHDOWN INC
SOUTHLAND CORP
SOUTHWESTERN BELL
TELEPHONE CO
SPIEGEL INC
SPRINGS INDUSTRIES INC
SPRINT CORP
SPS TECHNOLOGIES INC
SPX CORP*
STANDARD COMMERCIAL CORP
STANDARD MOTOR PRODUCTS
INC
STANDARD PRODUCTS CO
STANDARD REGISTER CO
STANDEX INTERNATIONAL
CORP
STANLEY FURNITURE CO INC
STANLEY WORKS
STARRETT L S CO

SCOTTS CO
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STERLING CHEMICAL HOLDINGS
INC
STERLING FINANCIAL CORP
STERLING SOFTWARE INC*
STEWART & STEVENSON
SERVICES INC
STOKELY VAN CAMP INC
STOLELY USA INC*
STONE CONTAINER CORP
SUN CO INC
SUNDSTRAND CORP*
SUPERMARKETS GENERAL
HOLDINGS CORP*
SUPER VALU INC
SWANK INC
SYSCO CORP
TECUMSEH PRODUCTS CO
TEKTRONIX INC*
TELEFLEX INC
TELEPHONE & DATA SYSTEMS
INC
TEMPLE INLAND INC

TIFFANY & CO
TIMES MIRROR CO
TIMKEN CO
TJX COMPANIES INC
TNP ENTERPRISES INC
TODD SHIPYARDS CORP
TOKHEIM CORP
TORCHMARK CORP
TOSCO CORP
TRANSTECHNOLOGY CORP*
TRAVELERS GROUP INC
TREDEGAR INDUSTRIES INC
TRIBUNE CO
TULTEX CORP
TURNER CORP
U HAUL INTERNATIONAL INC
US WEST COMMUNICATIONS
INC
UAL CORP
UNION CAMP CORP
UNION PACIFIC CORP

TEREX CORP*
TESORO PETROLEUM CORP
TEXACO INC

UNION TEXAS PETROLEUM
HOLDINGS INC
UNISYS CORP
UNITED AIR LINES INC
UNITED COMPANIES
FINANCIAL CORP
UNITED ILLUMINATING CO

TEXAS GAS TRANSMISSION CORP*
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE OF
AMERICA INC

TEXTRON INC
THIOKOL CORP

UNITED STATIONERS INC*
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP

THOMAS & BETTS CORP
THOMAS INDUSTRIES INC

UNITIL CORP

TIDEWATER INC

UNIVERSAL FOODS CORP

TENNANT CO
TENNECO INC
TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE CO

UNIVERSAL CORP
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UNOCAL CORP
UNUMCORP
US AIRWAYS GROUP INC
US WEST INC
USF&G CORP
VALSPAR CORP
VARCO INTERNATIONAL INC
VALERO ENERGY CORP
VARLEN CORP
VIACOM INC
VISHAY INTERTECHNOLOGY INC
VONS COMPANIES INC
VULCAN MATERIALS INC

WOODWARD GOVERNOR CO
WPL HOLDINGS INC
WRIGLEY WILLIAM JR CO
WYMAN GORDON CO
WYNNS INTERNATIONAL INC
XEROX CORP
* Decreased or terminated OPEBs
during the period examined

WALBRO CORP
WALGREEN CO
WARNACO GROUP INC
WARNER LAMBERT CO
WASHINGTON POST CO
WEIRTON STEEL CORP
WESTERN RESOURCES INC
WESTMORELAND COAL CO*
WEYERHAEUSER CO
WHEELABRATOR TECHNOLOGIES
INC
WHIRLPOOL CORP
WHITMAN CORP
WHXCORP
WICORINC*
WILLAMETTE INDUSTRIES INC
WILLIAMS COMPANIES INC
WINNEBAGO INDUSTRIES INC
WISCONSIN BELL INC
WITCO CORP
WOLVERINE WORLD WIDE INC
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